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Using International Law in Somalia’s Post-
Conflict Reconstruction 
CHIARA GIORGETTI* 
For the first time since 1991, Somalia has an interna-
tionally-recognized government.  Established in Au-
gust 2012, the Somali Federal Government (SFG) has 
been officially recognized by many nations and inter-
national organizations.  The process of bringing So-
malia fully back into the international community, 
however, remains long and complex.  This Article ar-
gues that, in order to be successful, Somalia’s recon-
struction must include a robust international law 
component.  By mandating frameworks for action and 
establishing best practices, international law should 
guide and strengthen reconstruction efforts. 
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um at Richmond University School of Law.  I am grateful for comments received there. I am 
particularly grateful for comments by Dianne Marie Amann, Harlan Cohen, Timothy Feigh-
ery, Jim Gibson, Bernard Harborne, Corinna Lain, Andre Le Sage, Tim Meyer, Vikram 
Raghavan, and Jeremy Sharpe. 
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INTRODUCTION 
For the first time since 1991 and after twenty years of law-
lessness, signs of normalcy have begun to appear in Somalia.  In Au-
gust 2012, the Somali Federal Government (SFG) was established.  
The United States recognized the SFG on January 17, 2013, and 
normalized its relationship with the country.1  Many other govern-
ments and international organizations also normalized relations with 
Somalia in the belief that the seemingly unresolvable civil war was 
finally over. 
However, the supposed new beginning may just be wishful 
thinking.  Its international recognition notwithstanding, the SFG has 
little effective or direct control over the majority of the country.  Its 
existence is ensured largely by a military mission under the aegis of 
international bodies, namely, the African Union and the United Na-
tions.  Civilians continue to suffer from conflict-related abuses, and 
the presence of the al-Qaida affiliated terrorist group al-Shabaab re-
mains strong.2  Tellingly, Somalia continues to top the lists of “most 
failed” and “most corrupt” countries in the world.3 
The challenges and contradictions faced by Somalia therefore 
make it the perfect case study to assess the use and effectiveness of 
international law in post-conflict regions.  Indeed, state failure, which 
so distinctively characterizes Somalia, does not result in the applica-
tion of any distinct international legal framework.  It is considered a 
non-event in international law, which still lacks both a definition of 
state failure and an agreed legal framework to deal with its causes 
and consequences.4  This means that, under international law, no spe-
cial set of rules applies or is triggered by state failure.5 
 
 1. See U.S. Relations With Somalia, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE BUREAU OF AFRICAN 
AFFAIRS (Aug. 16, 2013), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2863.htm. 
 2. Matt Bryden, Somalia Redux?  Assessing the New Somali Federal Government, 
CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES (2013), available at 
http://csis.org/files/publication/130819_Bryden_SomaliaRedux_WEB.pdf; see infra  Part 
I.B. 
 3. The Failed State Index 2013, FUND FOR PEACE (Nov. 10, 2013), 
http://ffp.statesindex.org/rankings-2013-sortable; Corruption Perceptions Index 2012, 
TRANSPARENCY INT’L (Nov. 10, 2013), http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2012/results/. 
 4. Chiara Giorgetti, Why Should International Law Be Concerned About State 
Failure?, 16 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 469 (2010). 
 5. Additionally, international law obligations continue to exist and continue to be 
binding, irrespective of the situation of state failure—and thus the inability to fulfill those 
obligations.  See generally CHIARA GIORGETTI, A PRINCIPLED APPROACH TO STATE FAILURE:  
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Thus, important questions need to be answered:  How can 
Somalia regain its place as a member of the U.N. and other interna-
tional organizations?  How can it reengage with donors and in the 
diplomatic arena?  More urgently, how can the new government deal 
with border security, piracy, and terrorism, all of which pose interna-
tional threats?  How can it guarantee territorial and maritime borders 
that became porous and undefined during the civil war?  What basic 
international legal framework is needed to attract private invest-
ments? 
This Article demonstrates that international law is an appro-
priate, logical source to answer such questions.  Globalization has 
made state action necessarily have inter-state ramifications, in such a 
way that implicates international law.  Post-conflict reconstruction, 
too, is inter-state dependent and should formally include an explicit 
international law component. 
Part I of this Article explains the present situation in Somalia 
and the main challenges facing the SFG.  Part II assesses the current 
role that international law plays in Somali reconstruction, both inside 
and outside of Somalia.  Finally, Part III argues that international law 
can strengthen post-conflict reconstruction efforts and further 
demonstrates, based on specific examples, that international law can 
play at least three fundamental roles in post-conflict situations:  it can 
mandate a framework for action, offer guidance by indicating core 
issues, and provide examples of best practices. 
I. RECONSTRUCTION OF SOMALIA:  PROCESS AND PRIORITIES 
In August 2012, Somalia completed a long process of politi-
cal transition, which resulted in the National Constituent Assembly’s 
adoption of a provisional constitution, the election of a new presi-
dent, federal parliament, and speaker, and the naming of a new prime 
minister and cabinet. 
For the first time since 1991, when Siad Barre fled Moga-
dishu and left a long-lasting power vacuum, Somalia has an interna-
tionally-recognized government, the SFG.  The new President, Has-
san Sheikh Mohamud, was elected on September 10, 2012.  He is a 
respected figure who was a civil society activist and researcher.6 
As the following sections demonstrate, signs of normalcy 
 
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY ACTIONS IN EMERGENCY SITUATIONS (2010). 
 6. BRYDEN, supra note 2, at 4. 
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have appeared throughout Somalia.  However, in many instances, 
such positive progress is countered by equally strong deteriorations.  
After assessing the positive and negative trends that have emerged 
from Somalia’s new reality, this section highlights several key issues 
that the new government must address in its post-conflict transition. 
A. The New Somali Federal Government:  An Ongoing Process 
Following the ouster of Mohamed Siad Barre in 1991, Soma-
lia was engulfed in protracted civil war.  Clan-affiliated warlords and 
militants battled for control.  Somalia soon became the emblematic 
symbol of state failure.7 
During that period, Somalia lacked a functioning government 
capable of providing for the basic needs of its people, including secu-
rity, physical and legal infrastructures, education, health services, 
administrative and political systems, and environmental and emer-
gency protection.  As a failed state, Somalia was no longer able “to 
perform the job of a nation-State in the modern world.”8  Somalia al-
so became the center of arms, drugs and human smuggling, the host 
of Islamic extremist terrorist groups, and the focus of piracy activi-
ties; thus, it also became a problem for the international community.9 
Numerous efforts at mediation and reconciliation were at-
tempted over the years, and a transitional government was finally es-
tablished in 2004.  Somalia’s political transition included the election 
of a new federal parliament and speaker, the adoption of a provision-
al constitution, the election of Hassan Sheikh Mohamud as President, 
and the naming of a new prime minister and cabinet.10  General elec-
 
 7. See GIORGETTI, A PRINCIPLED APPROACH, supra note 5. 
 8. Robert I. Rotberg, The New Nature of Nation-State Failure, 25 WASH. Q. 85, 87 
(2002).  Zartman usefully defines the consequences of state failure as follows:  “As the 
decision-making center of the government, the State is paralyzed and inoperative:  laws are 
not made, order is not preserved, and societal cohesion is not enhanced . . . .  As a territory, 
it no longer assures security and provisionment by a central sovereign organization.  As the 
authoritative political institution, it has lost its legitimacy, which is therefore up for grabs, 
and so has lost its right to command and conduct public affairs. . . .  [n]o longer functioning, 
with neither traditional nor charismatic nor institutional sources of legitimacy, it has lost the 
right to rule.”  William Zartman, Introduction:  Posing the Problem of State Collapse, in 
COLLAPSED STATES:  THE DISINTEGRATION OF LEGITIMATE AUTHORITY 1, 5 (I. William 
Zartman ed., 1995). 
 9. See KEN MENKHAUS, SOMALIA:  STATE COLLAPSE AND THE THREAT OF TERRORISM 
17 (2004) (calling Somalia “a failure among failed States”). 
 10. James Fergusson, Somalia:  A Failed State is Back From the Dead, THE 
INDEPENDENT (Jan. 13, 2013), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/somalia-a-
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tions are now scheduled for 2016.11  Eventually, several governments 
and international organizations officially or de facto recognized the 
new government. 
1. The First Step:  International Recognition by Governments and 
International Organizations 
The United States recognized the new government of Somalia 
on January 17, 2013 and subsequently normalized its relationship.12  
Then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton made the announcement at a 
joint press conference with Somali President Hassan Sheikh Moham-
ud.  Secretary Clinton congratulated the President and said that, 
though “there [was] still a long way to go and many challenges to 
confront,” one could already see “a new foundation for the better fu-
ture being laid.”13  The United States has also welcomed the African 
Union Mission in Somalia’s (AMISOM) success in driving the al-
Shabaab terrorist organization out of strategically important popula-
tion centers, and has underscored the continued U.S. commitment to 
support AMISOM and the Somali national forces in their responsibil-
ity of ensuring security throughout Somalia.14  U.S. recognition 
opened up new foreign assistance programs, including military train-
 
failed-state-is-back-from-the-dead-8449310.html. 
 11. Farhia Ali Abdi, Somalia:  2016 Election:  Optimism, Misgivings, and Leadership 
Analysis, HORN TRIBUNE, http://horntribune.com/somalia-2016-election-optimism-
misgivings-and-leadership-analysis-2/ (last visited Oct. 30, 2014); see AFRICAN UNION 
MISSION IN SOMALIA (AMISOM), CONSULTATIVE MEETING ON ENDING THE TRANSITION IN 
SOMALIA:  STATEMENT ON ADOPTION OF THE ROADMAP (2011), available at http://amisom-
au.org/2011/09/signed-statement-and-roadmap/. 
 12. Tom Watkins, After More than 2 Decades, U.S. Recognizes Somalia, CNN (Jan. 
17, 2013, 5:31 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/01/17/us/somalia-recognition/ (reporting that 
Secretary Clinton declared “we have moved into a normal sovereign-nation-to-sovereign 
nation position and we have moved into an era where we are going to be a good partner, a 
steadfast partner, to Somalia as Somalia makes the decisions for it own future”).  For an 
interesting analysis of the pros and cons of recognition for Somalia, see THE HERITAGE 
INSTITUTE FOR POLICY STUDIES, THE U.S. RECOGNITION OF SOMALIA:  IMPLICATIONS AND THE 
WAY FORWARD, HIPS POLICY BRIEFING 1 (2013), available at http://www. 
heritageinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/HIPS_Policy_Brief_001-2013_ENGLISH. 
pdf (warning that “in the past, Somali politicians never missed an opportunity to miss an 
opportunity,” and that “[w]hat Somali politicians and citizens should have been euphoric 
about is not the recognition itself—as the case has been—but the fact that in the eyes of 
United States, Somalia’s fortunes have improved so well that the U.S. wants to recognize 
it”). 
 13. Watkins, supra note 12. 
 14. See U.S. Relations, supra note 1. 
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ing and financing programs.15 
Other governments, such as Italy and the United Kingdom, 
followed suit.16  In October 2012, the Foreign Minister of Italy, Giu-
lio Terzi, visited Somalia, the first such high-level visit by an Italian 
government official in two decades.17  Twenty-two years after it 
closed, a new British embassy was opened by Foreign Secretary Wil-
liam Hague in Mogadishu on April 25, 2013.18  On February 2, 2012, 
Matt Baugh was accredited as the first British Ambassador to Soma-
lia in twenty-one years.19  Neil Wigan succeeded him in June 2013.20  
British embassy staffers are stationed in a compound at the interna-
tional airport in Mogadishu until the construction of the new British 
embassy is completed.21  Other countries that have officially or de 
facto recognized Somalia and have established relations with the 
SFG include Turkey, Norway, Sweden, the Netherlands, Kenya, and 
Ethiopia.22 
Several international organizations have also officially recog-
nized the new Somali government.  Importantly, for instance, the In-
ternational Monetary Fund (IMF) has officially recognized the new 
 
 15. See Watkins, supra note 12. 
 16. The United Kingdom opened the core office within the new British embassy at 
Mogadishu International Airport on April 25, 2013.  See Foreign Secretary Opens New 
British Embassy in Mogadishu, FOREIGN & COMMONWEALTH OFFICE (Apr. 25, 2013), 
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/foreign-secretary-opens-new-british-embassy-in-
mogadishu. 
 17. Italian FM in Surprise Visit to Somalia, ALJAZEERA (Oct. 24, 2012, 12:31 PM), 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2012/10/2012102493628246538.html. 
 18. Foreign Secretary Opens New British Embassy in Mogadishu, supra note 16.  
 19. About Matt, FOREIGN & COMMONWEALTH OFFICE BLOG, 
http://blogs.fco.gov.uk/mattbaugh/about-matt/ (last visited Oct. 30, 2014). 
 20. British Ambassador to Somalia Neil Wigan:  Biography, FOREIGN & 
COMMONWEALTH OFFICE, https://www.gov.uk/government/people/neil-wigan (last visited 
Oct. 30, 2014). 
 21. Foreign Secretary Opens New British Embassy in Mogadishu, supra note 16. 
 22. See REPUBLIC OF TURKEY MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, RELATIONS BETWEEN 
TURKEY AND SOMALIA, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/relations-between-turkey-and-somalia.en.mfa 
(last visited Oct. 30, 2014); NORWAY:  THE OFFICIAL SITE IN KENYA, NORWAY AND SOMALIA, 
(June 9, 2013), http://www.norway.or.ke/News_and_events/Somalia/#.UoPg2JHnlSU; 
EMBASSY OF SWEDEN:  NAIROBI, SWEDISH AMBASSADOR ACCREDITED TO SOMALIA (Apr. 17, 
2013), http://www.swedenabroad.com/Pages/StandardPage.aspx?id=55539&epslanguage=e 
n-GB; NETHERLANDS EMBASSY IN NAIROBI, KENYA, SOMALIA,  http://kenia.nlembassy.org/ 
organization/departments/somalia.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2014); Mahmoud Mohamed, 
Presidential Inauguration Ushers in New Era for Somalia, SABAHI (Sept. 17, 2012), 
http://sabahionline.com/en_GB/articles/hoa/articles/features/2012/09/17/feature-01. 
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government.23  The World Bank, the U.N., and the European Union 
have established relations with the SFG.24  One of the immediate 
consequences of recognition was that the European Union accepted 
the request from Somalia to accede to the ACP-EU Partnership 
Agreement (the “Cotonou Agreement”), allowing Somalia to access 
development finance cooperation.25 
The election of the SFG has also prompted the return of some 
basic services.  Turkish Airlines started a bi-weekly direct flight link-
ing Ankara to Mogadishu.26  Several other airlines also now fly regu-
larly to Somalia’s capital and other major towns.27  Additionally, 
Somalis may soon get international mail for the first time in twenty-
two years.28 
At the same time, several donor conferences were organized 
in 2013 to assist and coordinate activities in Somalia.  On May 7, 
2013, for instance, the British Government hosted a conference 
aimed at providing international support to Somalia.  A special con-
ference on Somalia, addressing the socio-economic development 
agenda, was also held on the margins of the fifth Tokyo International 
Conference on African Development in May 2013.29  Importantly, 
 
 23. Press Release, International Monetary Fund, IMF Recognizes the Federal 
Government of Somalia After 22-Year Interval (Apr. 12, 2013), available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2013/pr13119.htm (stating that “[t]he International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) today recognized the Federal Government of Somalia, headed by 
President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, paving the way for the resumption of relations after a 
22-year interval.  The decision is consistent with broad international support and recognition 
of the Federal Government.  Recognition of the government allows the IMF to offer Somalia 
technical assistance and policy advice”). 
 24. Press Release, Council of the European Union, 3245th Council Meeting 14 (July 
22, 2013) [hereinafter CEU Press Release], available at http://www.consilium. 
europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/138317.pdf (welcoming the progress 
made in Somalia and reconfirming “its support for the Federal Government”). 
 25. Somalia Joins the Cotonou Agreement, SABAHI (June 9, 2013), 
http://sabahionline.com/en_GB/articles/hoa/articles/newsbriefs/2013/06/09/newsbrief-05; 
see CEU Press Release, supra note 24, at 15 (welcoming “the recent decision of the Joint 
EU-ACP Council of Ministers on Somalia’s accession to the Cotonou Agreement”).  
 26. Somalia:  Turkish Airlines Begins Flights to Mogadishu, BBC NEWS (Mar. 6, 2012, 
11:55 AM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-17269620. 
 27. Daisy Carrington, Flying into Hostile Territory:  Somalia Experiences Boom in Air 
Travel, CNN (Aug. 26, 2013, 10:20 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/08/21/world/ 
africa/somalia-aviation-boom/. 
 28. Tom Miles, Return to Sender?  Maybe Not as Somalia to Restart Mail 22 Years on, 
REUTERS, Apr. 26, 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/04/26/us-somalia-postal-
idUSBRE93P0QF20130426. 
 29. Eric Johnston, Somalia Seeks Return to Global Fold, THE JAPAN TIMES (June 1, 
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the European Union and Somalia co-hosted a major donor meeting in 
September 2013 in Brussels, which developed a New Deal Compact:  
a soft-law agreement that proposes to work in partnership with the 
SFG.30  At the conference, Somali President Hassan Sheikh Moham-
ud identified four goals for his government:  security, meeting basic 
human needs, good governance, and foreign investment.  The New 
Deal Conference saw the participation of representatives of many 
governments and international organizations, including the African 
Development Bank, the African Union, the U.N., and the World 
Bank.31  High-ranking participants included the British Secretary of 
State for International Development, the Italian Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, and the French and Norwegian Ministers of International 
Development.32 
The U.N. Security Council adopted two important resolutions 
relating to Somalia in 2013.  Resolutions 2093 and 2102 extended the 
AMISOM mandate for another year and established the U.N. Assis-
tance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) as a new U.N. presence to assist 
with the stabilization and peacebuilding activities of the SFG.33  The 
“Somalia End of Transition Roadmap,” approved by the government 
and key international partners in 2011, calls for holding a constitu-
tional referendum in 2015 and a political election in Somalia in 
2016.34 
 
2013), http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2013/06/01/national/abe-africa-leaders-hope-
somalia-can -return-to-the-global-fold/#.UcM0sxYYLjQ/. 
 30. Somalia Conference:  What Next, FOREIGN & COMMONWEALTH OFFICE (May 13, 
2013), https://www.gov.uk/government/news/somalia-conference-what-next/. 
 31. A New Deal for Somalia:  Brussels Conference, Sept. 16, 2013, List of Heads of 
Delegation, http://eeas.europa.eu/somalia/new-deal-conference/participants.html. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Special Conference on Somalia on the Margins of TICAD V:  Co-Chairs’ 
Summary, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF JAPAN (June 1, 2013), 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/page5e_000011.html (reporting that “[t]he Special 
Conference on Somalia was held in Yokohama, Japan on May 31, 2013, on the margins of 
the Fifth Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD V).  The 
Conference was co-organized by the Government of Japan, the Government of the Federal 
Republic of Somalia and the African Union Commission, and was attended by Heads of 
State and Government, Ministers and high-level representatives from 35 countries and 
organizations”). 
 34. Briefing: Somalia’s Political Roadmap, INTEGRATED REGIONAL INFORMATION 
NETWORKS (Feb. 22, 2012), http://www.irinnews.org/fr/report/94926/briefing-somalia-s-
political-roadmap (detailing tasks needed to develop more permanent political institutions 
and greater national security and stability in Somalia).  The tasks relate to security issues, the 
drafting of a new constitution, political outreach and reconciliation, and ensuring good 
governance.  The Roadmap also details measures to counter piracy and local militia groups, 
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Selecting a new government is a breakthrough for Somalia. 
Returning to its place as a fully functioning actor in the international 
community, however, will take much time and effort. 
2. The Second Step:  Addressing the Other Side of the Coin 
The positive response to the new government may, however, 
just obscure a tale of two cities.  Indeed, the newly-established gov-
ernment has little effective control over important parts of the coun-
try.  Its existence is ensured by a military mission conducted by the 
African Union and ongoing assistance by the U.N. and other donors.  
Civilians continue to suffer from conflict-related abuses, including 
killings, displacement, and the diversion or confiscation of humani-
tarian assistance by armed groups, principally al-Shabaab.35 
Like its predecessors, the SFG has little effective control over 
most of the country.  The self-declared Republic of Somaliland in the 
northwest and Puntland State in the northeast are powerful regional 
authorities and their relations with the SFG remain unclear.36  Ac-
cording to the U.N., as of January 2014, there were more than 1.13 
million internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the country, and many 
Somalis have left Somalia and established residence in other coun-
tries, including the United States, Sweden, Italy, and the Nether-
lands.37 
The vast majority of Somalis still lives in a humanitarian cri-
sis.38  Serious human rights abuses continue.  These include killings, 
discrimination and violence against women and girls, rape and fe-
male genital mutilation, violence against journalists, and restrictions 
 
prevent the recruitment of children into armed groups, plan for elections, develop 
peacebuilding initiatives, and tackle corruption. 
 35. Security and Governance in Somalia:  Consolidating Gains, Confronting 
Challenges, and Charting the Path Forward Before the Subcomm. on African Affairs of the 
Senate Foreign Relations Comm., 113th Cong. (2013) (statement of Andre Le Sage, Senior 
Research Fellow at the Center for Strategic Research, Institute for National Strategic 
Studies, National Defense University); id. (statement of Amanda J. Dory, Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of Defense, African Affairs); id. (statement of E.J. Hogendoorn, Deputy Africa 
Program Director, International Crisis Group). 
 36. Statement of Andre Le Sage, supra note 35. 
 37. 2014 UNHCR Country Operations Profile—Somalia, UNHCR (Oct. 15, 2014), 
http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/page?page=49e483ad6&submit=GO. 
 38. Humanitarian Bulletin:  Somalia, U.N. OFFICE FOR THE COORDINATION OF 
HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS (Sept. 19, 2014), http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/ 
files/resources/OCHA%20Somalia%20Humanitarian%20Bulletin%20August%202014.pdf. 
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on freedom of the press.39  Other major human rights abuses include 
harsh and life-threatening prison conditions, arbitrary and politically 
motivated arrests and detentions, denial of fair trials, corruption, traf-
ficking in persons, abuse of and discrimination against minority 
clans, restrictions on workers’ rights, forced labor, and child labor.40  
Most of the abuses remain unpunished, and impunity remains the 
norm.41 
These dual images of Somalia—a resurrected nation and a 
heavily-burdened one—coexist, and they vividly demonstrate how 
much needs to be done.  The creation of the new government has 
nonetheless made it possible to discuss and identify specific post-
conflict priorities, which I discuss below. 
B. Post-Conflict Priorities 
International recognition is an important first step for Somalia 
in regaining its place as a full member of the international communi-
ty.42  However, to truly regain its domestic and international status, 
the SFG needs to address at least three key challenges pertaining to 
security, economic, and human rights issues. 
1. Security Issues 
Despite external recognition, security remains the main con-
cern in Somalia.  Security threats are multifaceted and include terror-
ism, piracy, and disputed maritime and territorial borders.  These 
threats have been acknowledged by the international community.  For 
example, on April 4, 2013, U.S. President Barack Obama renewed 
the national emergency with respect to Somalia declared by Execu-
tive Order 13536 of April 12, 2010.43 
At least three security issues are imperative and need to be 
 
 39. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND LABOR, 
SOMALIA 2012 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT (2013), available at http://www.state.gov 
/documents/organization/204377.pdf. 
 40. Id. at 1. 
 41. Id. at 29. 
 42. In general, recognition is for states, not governments.  The case of Somalia blurs 
that difference and calls for a rethinking of these norms.  See STEFAN SALOMON, THE 
RECOGNITION OF GOVERNMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (Vaughan Lowe et al. eds., 1998). 
 43. Letter from President Barack Obama, President of the United States, to John 
Boehner, Speaker of the United States House of Representatives and Joseph Biden, President 
of the U.S. Senate (Apr. 3, 2014) (on file with the COLUMBIA J. TRANSNAT’L L.). 
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addressed for Somalia to exit state failure and become an effective 
member of the international community.44  First, Somalia’s territorial 
and maritime boundaries remain undefined and contested.  Due to the 
long conflict, Somalia’s international territorial borders have become 
porous.  The delimitation of the borders with Ethiopia to the west and 
with Kenya to the south and west are not clear.  Moreover, internally, 
Somalia remains a fragmented country.  Though the provisional Con-
stitution provides for a federal system, it does not identify the con-
stituent federal states.45  During the civil war, Somaliland, a former 
British colony located at the northeast region of the country, declared 
independence and has been able to create a relatively peaceful admin-
istration.  Somaliland is not recognized as an independent state by the 
international community, however.  In turn, Somaliland does not it-
self recognize the new federal government.46  Discussions on how to 
address the impasse are ongoing, including a recent meeting mediat-
ed by Turkey between Somalia and Somaliland, which resulted in the 
signing of the “Ankara Accords.”47  Other regions, including Punt-
land and Jubaland, enjoy varying degrees of autonomy.  Yet the pro-
visional Constitution provides no indication of the power sharing 
structure to be adopted.48 
Similarly, maritime boundaries remain unclear.  Somalia en-
joys the longest coastline in Africa, affording it substantial fishing re-
sources and navigation routes.  More recently, several companies 
have expressed an interest in beginning oil exploration in these wa-
 
 44. GIORGETTI, A PRINCIPLED APPROACH, supra note 5. 
 45. PROVISIONAL CONSTITUTION art. 7 (Som.) (stating at (1) that “the sovereignty of the 
Federal Republic of Somalia extends over all the territory of the Federal Republic of 
Somalia, which includes the land, territorial sea, the island, the subsoil, the airspace, and the 
continental shelf, and any land and waters that join the Federal Republic of Somalia in 
accordance with a law that shall be passed by the Federal Parliament,” and at (4) that “[t]he 
boundaries of the Federal Republic of Somalia shall be those described in the 1960 
Constitution of Somalia.”); see id. art. 49(1) (providing that “the number and boundaries of 
the Federal Member States shall be determined by the House of the People of the Federal 
Parliament”); id. art. 49(2) (“The House of the People of the Federal Parliament, before 
determining the number and boundaries of the Federal Member States, shall nominate a 
national commission which shall study the issue, and submit a report of its finding with 
recommendations to the House of the People of the Federal Parliament.”). 
 46. See THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF SOMALIA, THE SOMALI COMPACT (2013), available 
at http://www.pbsbdialogue.org/The%20Somali%20Compact.pdf. 
 47. Somaliland and Somalia Sign Seven Point “Ankara Accords” During Tripartite 
Meeting in Turkey, SOMALILAND SUN (Apr. 13, 2013, 11:25 PM), http://somalilandsun.com/ 
index.php/politics/2666-somaliland-and-somalia-sign-seven-point-ankara-accords-during-
tripartite-meeting-in-turkey. 
 48. PROVISIONAL CONSTITUTION art. 54 (Som.). 
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ters.49  The location of the maritime boundaries between Kenya and 
Somalia, however, is disputed.50  There are overlapping claims for a 
portion of the maritime region, and the boundaries have not been of-
ficially delimited.  These unclear boundaries create conflict and de-
stabilize the region. 
A second security issue is terrorism.  Somali-born al-Qaida 
affiliate al-Shabaab remains a paramount concern.51  The attack in 
the Westgate Mall in Nairobi, Kenya in September 2013 vividly 
demonstrated the ability of the group to launch deadly attacks even 
outside of Somalia.52  Al-Shabaab training camps and safe havens ex-
ist in Somalia, and the group’s influence in Somalia remains a con-
cern.53  These well-founded terrorism fears make it impossible to ful-
ly transition to normalcy. 
A third security concern is piracy.  Piracy off the coast of 
Somalia has been rampant.  Commercial ships are routinely attacked 
and held for ransom.54  Pirates have been mostly active in Puntland, 
but have covered a large maritime area.55  Swift actions by the inter-
national community—chiefly thanks to a U.N. Security Council reso-
lution that allowed foreign military ships to enter Somali waters to 
repress piracy—have significantly reduced pirate attacks since 2012, 
when the number of attacks dropped by nearly 70% from the previ-
ous year.56  However, piracy continues to be an important security 
 
 49. See, e.g., Mark Townsend & Tariq Abdinasir, Britain Leads Dash to Explore for 
Oil in War-torn Somalia, THE GUARDIAN, Feb. 25, 2012, available at http://www 
.theguardian.com/world/2012/feb/25/britain-oil-dash-somalia; Kelly Gilblom, Turkish Oil 
Firm Genel to Explore Somalia from 2013, SOMALILAND PRESS (Oct. 31, 2012), 
http://somalilandpress.com/turkish-oil-firm-genel-to-explore-in-somalia-from-2013-36900. 
 50. Somalia Sues Kenya at Top UN Court over Maritime Border, AGENCE FRANCE-
PRESSE (Aug. 28, 2014), http://news.yahoo.com/somalia-sues-kenya-top-un-court-over-
maritime-225946278.html. 
 51. Statement of Andre Le Sage, supra note 35, at 2. 
 52. Id. at 8. 
 53. Somali al-Shabab Training Base in Lanta-Buro ‘Captured’, BBC NEWS (Jul. 11, 
2012, 10:56 AM), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-18800452.  
 54. Eugene Kontorovich, International Legal Responses to Piracy off the Coast of 
Somalia, 13 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. INSIGHTS (2009), http://www.asil.org/insights/ 
volume/13/issue/2/international-legal-responses-piracy-coast-somalia. 
 55. Jillian Keenan, Puntland is for Pirates:  Why are Convicted High-Seas Bandits 
Being Sent to the Somali Region that Profits from Their Crimes?, FOREIGN POLICY, Mar. 20, 
2014, available at http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/03/20/puntland_is_for_ 
pirates_somalia. 
 56. S.C. Res. 1816, U.N. Doc. S/Res/1816 (June 2, 2008); Monitoring Group on 
Somalia and Eritrea, Report, transmitted by letter dated July 12, 2013 from the Chairman of 
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concern. 
2. Economic Issues 
There can be no reconstruction of Somalia into a viable new 
state without the development of a sophisticated economic system.  
Such a system must be able to sustain a financial flow that can sup-
port the structure of the new state, support a vibrant private sector, 
and provide essential goods to all Somalis.  Yet Somalia has no bank-
ing system and the only remaining international bank, Barclays, 
which channels most remittances to Somalia from abroad, has threat-
ened to close the accounts Somali remittance companies use to 
transmit money.57 
Since the recognition of the new government, however, do-
nors have demonstrated a new willingness to allocate funds to Soma-
lia.58  For example, the European Union’s Political and Security 
Committee, the key body that defines and monitors the Union’s crisis 
response as part of the E.U. Common Foreign and Security Policy, 
made its first visit to Somalia on June 12, 2013.59  Similarly, the 
recognition of the provisional government by the United States has 
opened up the potential for Somalia to access funds deposited in the 
U.S. Federal Reserve Bank prior to the civil war.60  Section 25B of 
 
the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 
(2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea addressed to the President of the Security Council, ¶ 
53, U.N. Doc. S/2013/413 (July 12, 2013); see Alan Cowell, West African Piracy Exceeds 
Somalia Attacks, Report Says, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 2013, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/19/world/africa/west-african-piracy-exceeds-somali-
attacks-report-says.html. 
 57. Chris Spillane, Somalia Asks Barclays to Review Closing Money-Transfer Account, 
BLOOMBERG NEWS (Sept. 23, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-09-23/somalia-
asks-barclays-to-review-closing-money-transfer-account.html.  
 58. Henry Ridgwell, Donors Pledge $2.7 Billion in ‘New Deal’ for Somalia, VOICE OF 
AMERICA (Sept. 16, 2013, 9:00 AM), http://www.voanews.com/content/eu-pledges-650-
million-euros-for-somalia-reconstruction/1750496.html/. 
 59. Press Release, Magali Uytterhaeghe, EU Mission to Somalia, The EU’s “Political 
and Security Committee” Visits Somalia (June 12, 2013), http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/ 
somalia/documents/press_corner/20130612_en.pdf (noting that “[t]he [Committee] 
underlined the commitment of the EU to the new political [organization] and the people of 
Somalia, and the extensive support for the normalization of the situation in Somalia both 
politically and in terms of security”). 
 60. 12 U.S.C. § 632 (2006) (“No attachment or execution shall be issued against any 
Federal Reserve bank or its property before final judgment in any suit, action, or proceeding 
in any State, county, municipal, or United States court. Whenever (1) any Federal Reserve 
bank has received any property from or for the account of a foreign state which is recognized 
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the Federal Reserve Act provides that the Secretary of State may rec-
ognize accredited representatives of foreign states to the U.S. gov-
ernment and name such persons to receive and control property .61  
The newly approved Somali New Deal Compact resulted in the 
pledge of $2.7 billion for the implementation of a New Deal to help 
rebuild the country, including $870 million from the European Un-
ion.62 
In light of this newfound donors’ interest, two fundamental 
issues must be resolved before more funds may be allocated directly 
to the government.  First, a financial management system must be 
implemented, including anti-corruption legislation, and a banking 
system must be in place.  Second, the question of Somalia’s foreign 
debt must be addressed. 
Some donors mistrust the ability of Somalia’s government to 
handle large amounts of foreign money because of corruption.  So-
malia is considered the most corrupt country in the world.  In a recent 
report, the U.N. Monitoring Group on Somalia heavily criticized the 
former governor of the newly established Central Bank of Somalia, 
accusing him of maintaining a slush fund and reporting that the great 
majority of approved expenses were untraceable and made for private 
purposes.63  The Somalia National Bank is the Central Bank of So-
malia and, as such, it is tasked with managing Somalia’s monetary 
policy, including managing interest rates, setting reserve require-
ments, and acting as a lender of last resort to the banking sector dur-
ing financial crises.64  Without a working and credible Central Bank, 
Somalia will be unable to fully operate in the global financial market. 
 
by the Government of the United States, or from or for the account of a central bank of any 
such foreign state, and holds such property in the name of such foreign state or such central 
bank; (2) a representative of such foreign state who is recognized by the Secretary of State as 
being the accredited representative of such foreign state to the Government of the United 
States has certified to the Secretary of State the name of a person as having authority to 
receive, control, or dispose of such property; and (3) the authority of such person to act with 
respect to such property is accepted and recognized by the Secretary of State, and so 
certified by the Secretary of State to the Federal Reserve bank, the payment, transfer, 
delivery, or other disposal of such property by such Federal Reserve bank to or upon the 
order of such person shall be conclusively presumed to be lawful and shall constitute a 
complete discharge and release of any liability of the Federal Reserve bank for or with 
respect to such property.”). 
 61. Id. 
 62. Ridgwell, supra note 58.  
 63. Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea Report, supra note 56. 
 64. CENTRAL BANK OF SOMALIA, http://www.somalbanca.org/ (last visited Oct. 16, 
2014). 
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Moreover, Somalia owes approximately $1.8 billion in prin-
cipal arrears on long-term debt,65 with its total external debt valued at 
more than $3 billion.66  Although the IMF recognized Somalia’s new 
government, Somalia remains ineligible to borrow from it because of 
its outstanding arrears, which in April 2013 amounted to approxi-
mately $352 million.67  A fundamental question for the new Somali 
government is how to clear these arrears and thus gain access to the 
international financial markets, without overburdening and antago-
nizing private and public revenue bases.68 
It is likely that the payment of arrears and the question of debt 
relief will be negotiated with all involved actors, including the IMF, 
the World Bank, and the African Development Bank, once the SFG 
demonstrates its commitment to financial stability.  In the past, a bid 
donor has taken charge of repaying the entire debt, and this scenario 
may materialize in Somalia’s case as well.69  In the meantime, the 
question of how to re-launch the Somali economy and attract foreign 
investments remains fundamental. 
3. Human Rights and Transitional Justice 
Accountability for past human rights violations and abuses is 
a fundamental step for reconciliation.  Accountability, even decades 
 
 65. Somalia:  Principal Arrears, Public and Publicly Guaranteed (Current US$), 
QUANDL, http://www.quandl.com/WORLDBANK/SOM_DT_AXA_DPPG_CD (last visited 
Oct. 30, 2014) (defining principal in arrears on long-term debt as “principal repayment due 
but not paid, on a cumulative basis.  Long-term external debt is defined as debt that has an 
original or extended maturity of more than one year and that is owed to nonresidents by 
residents of an economy and repayable in foreign currency, goods, or services.  Data are in 
current U.S. dollars”). 
 66. Somalia: External Debt Stocks, INDEXMUNDI, http://www.indexmundi.com/facts/ 
somalia/external-debt-stocks (last visited Oct. 30, 2014) (defining total external debt as the 
“debt owed to nonresidents repayable in foreign currency, goods, or services.  Total external 
debt is the sum of public, publicly guaranteed, and private nonguaranteed long-term debt, 
use of IMF credit, and short-term debt”). 
 67. IMF Recognizes the Federal Government, supra note 23. 
 68. Matt Baugh, Somalia and the G8:  Push to Start, FOREIGN & COMMONWEALTH 
OFFICE:  GLOBAL CONVERSATIONS (Apr. 10, 2013), http://blogs.fco.gov.uk/mattbaugh/ 
2013/04/10/somalia-and-the-g8-push-to-start/ (“[T]he process is reciprocal. [International 
Financial Institutions] re-engagement is contingent on the commitment of the Federal 
Government of Somalia continuing to make progress on strengthening transparency and 
accountability (both to Somalis and its partners).”). 
 69. Net Official Development Assistance and Official Aid Received (current USD), 
WORLD BANK, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/DT.ODA.ALLD.CD (last visited Oct. 16, 
2014). 
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late, strengthens the chances of durable peace and security.  Allega-
tions that crimes against humanity and war crimes were and still are 
committed in Somalia have come from different sources.  The U.N., 
for example, called for the prosecution of those who allegedly com-
mitted atrocities in 1993—more than twenty years ago.  Other similar 
calls have followed.70 
Subsequent appeals for investigations and accountability have 
continued.71  In 2013, the U.N. Security Council stressed “the need 
for the Federal Government of Somalia to ensure that all perpetrators 
of serious violations and abuses of human rights and serious viola-
tions of international humanitarian law are held accountable.”72  The 
U.N. Secretary-General then requested that the local staff offer the 
government assistance in order to “review, develop and implement 
legislation necessary to comply with international human rights and 
protection standards . . . [and] provide assistance . . . [to] monitor[] 
and report[] on grave violations of children’s rights [as well as other 
grave human rights violations.]”73 
 
 70.  S.C. Res. 814, ¶¶ 8, 35, U.N. Doc. S/RES/814 (Mar. 26, 1993) (noting with deep 
regret and concern the continuing reports of widespread violations of international 
humanitarian law and requesting that the Secretary-General assist in the re-establishment of 
a Somali police, as appropriate at the local, regional, or national level, to assist in the 
restoration and maintenance of peace, stability, and law and order, including the 
investigation and facilitation of the prosecution of serious violations of international 
humanitarian law); Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Somalia, 
Advisory Services and Technical Cooperation in the Field of Human Rights, Comm’n on 
Hum. Rts., ¶ 32, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2000/110 (Jan. 26, 2000) (by Mona Rishmawi) 
(declaring that many acts that could be qualified as war crimes or crimes against humanity 
were committed in Somalia, which could give rise to international criminal jurisdiction, 
either by an international criminal tribunal or by the exercise of universal jurisdiction by 
national courts, and encouraging the authorities in foreign countries to take steps to bring to 
justice those suspected of committing such crimes in Somalia); Special Rapporteur of the 
Situation of Human Rights in Somalia, Advisory Services and Technical Cooperation in the 
Field of Human Rights, Comm’n on Hum. Rts., ¶ 40, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1999/103 (Jan. 26, 
2000) (by Mona Rishmawi) (“[T]he establishment of an international tribunal for Somalia 
might be envisaged at some stage.”). 
 71. See, e.g., IHASA’s Current Research:  Transitional Justice in the Context of 
Somalia, ALLIANCE FOR PEACEBUILDING:  INSTITUTE FOR HORN OF AFRICA STUDIES AND 
AFFAIRS (Sept. 27, 2013), http://www.allianceforpeacebuilding.org/2013/09/ihasas-current-
research-transitional-justice-in-the-context-of-somalia/; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD 
REPORT 2011 165–70 (2011), available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/ 
reports/wr2011.pdf; AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, ANNUAL REPORT 2011:  SOMALIA (2011), 
http://www.amnesty.org/en/region/somalia/report-2011. 
 72. S.C. Res.  2102, ¶ 36, U.N. Doc. S/Res/2102 (May 2, 2013). 
 73. U.N. Secretary-General, Results of the Secretary-General’s Technical Assessment 
Mission to Somalia, Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 2093, ¶ 18, U.N. Doc. 
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Importantly, the SFG has also recognized the importance of 
human rights.74  The Provisional Constitution provides for the estab-
lishment of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission—the implemen-
tation acts, however, have not yet been drafted.75 
The establishment of a new, internationally recognized feder-
al government for Somalia is an important development.  It brings 
Somalia closer to the international community and has resulted in an 
increased interest and commitment by its members.  Resolving secu-
rity problems, tackling financial questions, and addressing the issue 
of past human rights violations are necessary priorities for the suc-
cess of the SFG. 
II. POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW IN 
SOMALIA 
Numerous international actors are present in Somalia to assist 
the SFG in its reconstruction efforts.  These include international or-
ganizations, state donors, and non-governmental organizations.  The-
se actors are engaged in an essentially political process, but among 
the many advisors and experts working in Somalia, legal advisors are 
absent.76  Indeed, the present reconstruction approach adopted by the 
international community does not include an explicit international 
 
S/2013/239 (Apr. 19, 2013). 
 74. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 2102, ¶ 9, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2102 (May 2, 2013) (“Welcoming 
the Federal Government of Somalia’s commitment to improving human rights in Somalia, 
expressing its concern at the reports of violations of human rights, including extrajudicial 
killings, violence against women, children and journalists, arbitrary detention and pervasive 
sexual and gender-based violence, particularly in camps for internally displaced persons, and 
underscoring the need to end impunity, uphold human rights and to hold accountable those 
who commit any such related crimes.”). 
 75. PROVISIONAL CONSTITUTION art. 111(I) (Som.) (providing that:  “(1) There shall be 
established a Truth and Reconciliation Commission to foster national healing, reconciliation 
and unity and to ensure that matters relating to impunity, revenge and other triggers of 
violence are addressed through a legal and state directed process. (2) The Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission shall be independent, impartial and representative and shall 
include: traditional elders and leaders, members of the Federal Parliament, respected 
members of civil society, judges and security personnel. (3) The mandate of the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission shall include:  (a) Bearing witness to, record, and in some cases, 
grant amnesty to the perpetrators of crimes relating to human rights violations, and 
rehabilitation of the criminals; and (b) Promoting forgiveness, reconciliation and national 
unity”). 
 76. This is an observation that I made during my trip to Kenya and is further supported 
by interviews with Somali experts. 
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law component. 
This section first reviews the approach presently adopted by 
the U.N. and other actors in the international community to post-
conflict reconstruction.  It then explains why international law must 
play a role in post-conflict reconstruction.  Finally, it focuses on So-
malia’s most important existing international law obligations to show 
how fundamentally intrinsic international law has become to all state 
action.77 
A. Lack of An International Law Component 
Some experts have recently argued that a special set of rules 
should apply to post-conflict situations.  These rules, aptly referred to 
as jus post bellum, would apply to situations after a war is ended.78  
Jus post bellum aims to create a body of law that applies after a war 
ends, in the important period of reconstruction.  It includes a respon-
sibility of the victors to participate in the reconstruction of the de-
feated country.79  These rules, however, apply only in the aftermath 
of an international conflict, where victors and losers are clearly de-
fined.  In Somalia, the extensive civil war has not created clear win-
ners.  Moreover, this doctrine applies only in international conflicts 
and therefore does not apply to the civil war in Somalia. 
 
 77. GIORGETTI, A PRINCIPLED APPROACH, supra note 5, at xv–xvii. 
 78. See Carsten Stahn, Jus ad Bellum, Jus in Bello . . . ‘Jus post Bellum’?, 17 EUR. J. 
INT’L L. 921, 921 (2006); see also SYMPOSIUM, Just and Unjust Warriors:  Marking the 35th 
Anniversary of Walzer’s Just and Unjust Wars, 24 EUR. J. INT’L L. 13 (2013); Antonia 
Chayes, Chapter VII½: Is Jus post Bellum Possible?, 24 EUR. J. INT’L L. 291 (2013); 
Guglielmo Verdirame, What to Make of Jus post Bellum:  A Response to Antonia Chayes, 24 
EUR. J. INT’L L. 307 (2013); Larry May, Jus post Bellum, Proportionality and the Fog of 
War, 24 EUR. J. INT’L L. 315 (2013); Ruti Teitel, Rethinking Jus post Bellum in an Age of 
Global Transitional Justice:  Engaging with Michael Walzer and Larry May, 24 EUR. J. 
INT’L L. 335 (2013). 
 79. The paradigmatic shift that the creation of a jus post bellum would entail is well-
described by Verdirame, supra note 78, at 311–12 (“It is hard to think of the emergence of 
an obligation to reconstruct incumbent upon the victors as a superficial addition to the 
existing law. It would rather signal a paradigm shift in the legal regulation of war:  from a 
Grotian approach to a Kantian one . . . .  In this discussion we should not lose sight of what it 
is within the power of victors to accomplish.  Although the states that won a conflict, and the 
international community in general, may help with reconstruction, success does not 
ultimately depend on them.  It would be unfair to impose an obligation of result on the 
victors where that result is one that they cannot deliver.  It might even be counterproductive 
if it ended up supporting the perception among the defeated that reconstruction is the 
responsibility of others.  Ultimately, unless people acquire a sense of political ownership and 
moral urgency about their future, there can be reconstruction only in the most superficial of 
senses.”). 
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There is also a significant corpus of state and international in-
stitutional practice that addresses various kinds of post-war situa-
tions.  These, however, are essentially ad hoc political processes.  
The U.N., for example, identified post-conflict peace building and 
reconstruction as a separate area of intervention more than twenty 
years ago with the Agenda for Peace.80  Since then, the U.N. has been 
involved as an advisor in numerous post-conflict situations, including 
in Afghanistan, Burundi, Central African Republic, Iraq, Lebanon, 
and Somalia.81 
More recently, in December 2005, the U.N. General Assem-
bly and the U.N. Security Council adopted resolutions to create the 
Peacebuilding Commission.82  The Commission, presently chaired by 
Ambassador Antonio de Aguiar Patriota of Brazil, aims to bring to-
gether all relevant actors to advise and develop integrated strategies 
for post-conflict peace building and recovery; to focus attention on 
the reconstruction and institution-building efforts needed for post-
conflict recovery; to improve coordination within and outside the 
U.N.; to develop best practices; and to ensure predictable and long-
lasting financing for early recovery.83 
 
 80. U.N. Secretary-General, An Agenda for Peace:  Preventive Diplomacy, 
Peacemaking and Peace-Keeping:  Rep. of the Secretary-General, ¶ 55, U.N. Doc. 
A/47/277-S/24111 (June 17, 1992) (“Peacemaking and peace-keeping operations, to be truly 
successful, must come to include comprehensive efforts to identify and support structures 
which will tend to consolidate peace and advance a sense of confidence and well-being 
among people.  Through agreements ending civil strife, these may include disarming the 
previously warring parties and the restoration of order, the custody and possible destruction 
of weapons, repatriating refugees, advisory and training support for security personnel, 
monitoring elections, advancing efforts to protect human rights, reforming or strengthening 
governmental institutions and promoting formal and informal processes of political 
participation.”). 
 81. See Ongoing Political and Peacebuilding Missions, U.N. DEP’T OF FIELD SUPPORT, 
http://www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/map/dpko/ppbm.pdf (last visited Oct. 30, 2014); see 
also Harmonized List of Fragile Situations FY14, WORLD BANK, http://siteresources. 
worldbank.org/EXTLICUS/Resources/511777-1269623894864/Harmonizedlistoffragilesta 
tesFY14.pdf (last visited Oct. 30, 2014). 
 82. See G.A. Res. 60/180, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/180 (Dec. 20, 2005); S.C. Res. 1645, 
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1645 (Dec. 20, 2005). 
 83. See generally Mandate, U.N. PEACEBUILDING COMM’N, http://www.un.org/en 
/peacebuilding/mandate.shtml (last visited Oct. 30, 2014).  The Peacebuilding Commission 
(PBC) operates in three principal configurations:  the Organizational Committee, the 
Country Specific Configurations, and Working Groups on Lessons Learned.  Structure & 
Membership, U.N. PEACEBUILDING COMM’N, http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/ 
structuremember.shtml (last visited Oct. 30, 2014).  The thirty-one members of the PBC 
Organizational Committee include seven each for the General Assembly, the Security 
Council, and the Economic and Social Council, five for the top providers of military 
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The World Bank has also singled out “Fragile and Conflict-
affected Situations” (FCSs) as a priority for its goal to eradicate ex-
treme poverty by 2030.  In 2011, the World Bank dedicated its annu-
al World Development Report (WDR) to “Conflict, Security and De-
velopment.”  The 2011 WDR called for a paradigm shift in the 
development community’s approach to fragile and conflict-affected 
situations.84  The shift was premised on the idea that violence and 
other challenges could not be resolved by short-term solutions and 
that comprehensive institutional strengthening was necessary to pro-
vide security, justice, and jobs to people, and thus ensure long lasting 
peace. 
Separately, several states affected by conflict and that are un-
dergoing a transition to the next stage of development have created a 
voluntary association called the “g7+.”85  The objectives of the g7+ 
are to share experiences and learn from each another, to promote 
state-building and peacebuilding, and to advocate for reforms in the 
way the international community engages in conflict-affected 
states.86 
These efforts signal the growing interest of addressing post-
conflict reconstruction through the lenses of international law.  The 
effort is still nascent, however, and requires further development. 
Two particular and important post-reconstruction frameworks 
are specifically applicable to the situation in Somalia:  the govern-
ment-centered New Deal Compact and the international community-
oriented UNSOM.  Neither, however, espouses an international law 
approach.  Each is examined in detail below. 
 
personnel and civilian police to U.N. missions and five for the top providers of assessed and 
voluntary contributions to U.N. funds.  Organizational Committee Members, U.N. 
PEACEBUILDING COMM’N, http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/orgcommittee.shtml (last 
visited Oct. 30, 2014).  The PBC is now active in Burundi, the Central African Republic, 
Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Sierra Leone, and Liberia. Country Specific Configurations, U.N. 
PEACEBUILDING COMM’N, http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/countryconfig.shtml (last 
visited Oct. 15, 2014). 
 84. THE WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2011:  CONFLICT, SECURITY AND 
DEVELOPMENT 1–2 (2011), available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWDRS/ 
Resources/WDR2011_Full_Text.pdf. 
 85. Introduction, G7+, http://www.g7plus.org (last visited Nov. 2, 2014).  Member 
countries presently include:  Afghanistan, Burundi, Central African Republic, Côte D’Ivoire, 
the Democratic Republic of Congo, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Liberia, Papua New 
Guinea, Sierra Leone, Solomon Island, Somalia, South Sudan, Timor-Leste, and Togo. 
 86. Id. 
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1. The New Deal Compact 
In October 2013, the Somali government and several donors 
met in Brussels to draft and finalize the New Deal Somali Compact.87  
New Deal Compacts are documents negotiated between new gov-
ernments in fragile states and members of the international communi-
ty within the framework developed by the 2011 Fourth High Level 
Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan, Korea.88 
The Somali Compact outlines priorities and commitments of 
the SFG and how international funds will be used for recovery.89  
The New Deal Compact sets priorities and new support for the recon-
struction of Somalia for 2014 to 201690 and is based on an inclusive 
process initiated by the government of Somalia and the international 
community in December 2012.91  It is designed to provide an over-
arching strategic framework that coordinates political, security, and 
development efforts with the aim of ensuring peace and promoting 
statebuilding.92  In line with previous New Deal Compacts, the So-
mali government identified five strategic objectives to support Soma-
li peace- and statebuilding goals:  (1) inclusive politics, (2) security, 
 
 87. A New Deal Compact for Somalia, G7+ (Oct. 8, 2013), http://www.g7plus.org/ 
news-feed/2013/10/8/a-new-deal-compact-for-somalia. 
 88.  New Deal Compacts represent a new way for the international community to 
engage with fragile and failing states.  See generally INTERNATIONAL DIALOGUE ON 
PEACEBUILDING AND STATEBUILDING, A NEW DEAL FOR ENGAGEMENT IN FRAGILE STATES 
(2013), available at http://www.newdeal4peace.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/new-deal-
for-engagement-in-fragile-states-en.pdf.  On November 30, 2011, the “New Deal for 
Engagement in Fragile States,” which was developed through the forum of the International 
Dialogue for Peacebuilding and Statebuilding, was presented and widely endorsed at the 4th 
High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan, Korea.  The New Deal Compacts were 
developed as a new way to tackle the specific problems of fragile and failed states working 
to achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).  Donor countries and several 
international organizations recognized that transitioning out of fragility was a long political 
process requiring the engagement and ownership of receiving countries.  New Deal Pilots 
are currently being implemented in Afghanistan, Central African Republic, the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, Liberia, Sierra Leone, South Sudan, and Timor Leste together with 
several partners.  See generally New Deal Pilots, NEW DEAL, http://www.newdeal4peace. 
org/new-deal-pilots/ (last visited on Oct. 30, 2014).  
 89. See THE SOMALI COMPACT, supra note 46. 
 90. The EU and Somalia to Hold “The New Deal for Somalia Conference, 16 Sept. 
2013,” EUR. COMM’N. (Jul. 30, 2013), http://ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-2014/ashton/ 
topics/20130729_en.htm.  
 91. See THE SOMALI COMPACT, supra note 46, at 3. 
 92. Id. at 4–12. 
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(3) justice, (4) economic foundations, and (5) revenue and services.93  
Each strategic objective then identifies specific priorities and action 
items. 
Priority 1 of the justice strategic objective, for example, re-
quires that “key priority laws in the legal framework, including on 
the reorganization of the judiciary, are aligned with the Constitution 
and international standards.”94  Priority 4 under the security strategic 
objective calls for the development of “an effective maritime security 
strategy within the framework of the Maritime Resource and Security 
Strategy.”95  Priority 1 of the economic goundations strategic objec-
tive urges enhancing “the productivity of high priority sectors and re-
lated value chains, including through the rehabilitation and expansion 
of critical infrastructure for transport, market access, trade, and ener-
gy.”96 
Each of the priorities is to be further developed with specific 
milestones that include delivery dates and assigned responsibilities 
within the government and by the development partners’ support.  
These milestones, however, are either very vague or altogether lack-
ing.  In the context of the justice priority, for example, the milestones 
are to create a Legal Policy and Drafting Unit by 2014, to establish a 
Constitutional Court and a Judicial Service Commission, and to re-
view existing legal frameworks including the organization of the ju-
diciary and witness and victim protection—without giving any fur-
ther details on mandates and structures.97  Similarly, the security 
priority requires the government to ratify the Somali Maritime Secu-
rity and Resource Strategy by 2014 and to create a maritime coordi-
nation mechanism.98  The economic foundation priority is equally 
vague and requires the strengthening of productive sectors, the com-
pletion of two flagship programs on “Rapid Rehabilitation of Infra-
structure,” and the preparation of a growth strategy program, though 
it does not specify who within the government is responsible for ac-
complishing any of these goals.99 
International law is not one of the enumerated pillars and is 
not identified as a cross-sectorial tool to implement existing priori-
 
 93. Id. at 5–13. 
 94. Id. at 7. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 9. 
 97. Id. at 33. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. at 34. 
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ties.  However, international law obligations permeate all of the iden-
tified priorities and goals.  Given Somalia’s international obligations, 
international law provisions should be better taken into account in the 
development of action items. 
2. The United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia 
From an international perspective, the U.N. Security Council 
unanimously established UNSOM on May 2, 2013, for an initial re-
newable term of twelve months.100  UNSOM’s core role is to act as 
an enabler to foster an environment that can support the stabilization 
and peacebuilding process.101  Within this role, UNSOM’s mandate 
is to provide policy advice to the SFG and to AMISOM on a variety 
of issues including peacebuilding and statebuilding, governance, se-
curity sector reform and rule of law, development of the federal sys-
tem, and coordination of international donors’ support.102   
Specifically, UNSOM will focus on four key areas: 
• Good offices:  support reconciliation efforts, assist 
with mediation and facilitation in support of the Gov-
ernment to deliver core political tasks, such as the de-
velopment of a federal system, the constitutional re-
view process and subsequent referendum on the 
constitution, and preparations for elections in 2016; 
•  Rule of law and security sector:  support the Govern-
ment’s priority objectives of transforming and build-
ing Somalia’s security and justice institutions by 
providing technical advice and aligning security sector 
reform, rule of law (including police, justice and cor-
rections), disengagement of combatants, disarmament, 
demobilization and reintegration, maritime security, 
and mine action; 
•  Human rights:  promote awareness and respect for 
human rights with a focus on women’s empowerment, 
child protection, and prevention of conflict-related 
sexual and gender-based violence; strengthen Soma-
lia’s justice and human rights institutions; monitor, in-
 
 100. S.C. Res. 2102, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2102 (May 2, 2013). 
 101. UNITED NATIONS POLITICAL OFFICE FOR SOMALIA, UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE 
MISSION IN SOMALIA (2013), available at http://unpos.unmissions.org/LinkClick.aspx 
?fileticket=TUqlSABGCOA%3d &tabid=9705 &mid=12667&language=en-US. 
 102. Id. 
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vestigate, prevent, and report on any abuses or viola-
tions of human rights and international humanitarian 
law committed in Somalia; support the Government to 
review, develop, and implement necessary legislation 
in compliance with international human rights stand-
ards; and 
• Coordination of international assistance:  support the 
Government’s efforts to coordinate donor support, in 
particular for security sector assistance and maritime 
security, stability and recovery, public finance man-
agement and capacity development, working with bi-
lateral and multilateral partners through the New Deal 
framework.103 
Both the New Deal Compact and the UNSOM mandate speci-
fy important policies and priorities to enable post-conflict reconstruc-
tion. The Compact is directed mostly to the SFG, and provides for 
collaboration with numerous international actors.  Conversely, 
UNSOM focuses on actions to be taken by the international commu-
nity to assist the SFG in reconstruction efforts.  Both plans essentially 
provide policy directions but do not provide guidelines or frame-
works to be followed to achieve the desired outcomes.  Furthermore, 
neither plan includes a separate international law component or ex-
plicitly refers to the use of international law provisions.  This is 
shortsighted.  As the next section demonstrates, international law can 
be immensely useful in Somalia’s post-conflict reconstruction. 
B. The Importance of International Law 
Increased globalization and the interconnectedness of states’ 
actions mean that international law necessarily plays an increasingly 
important role in all states’ actions.104  As such, post-conflict priori-
ties cannot be appropriately addressed without referring to interna-
tional law.  Indeed, becoming an effective player in the international 
community has become a necessity for any country in order to ensure 
its development, to guarantee basic rights and protections to its peo-
ple, and to promote stability within the international community. 
 
 103. Id. at 1–2; see S.C. Res. 2102, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2102 (May 2, 2013). 
 104. See, e.g., Nico Krisch & Benedict Kingsbury, Introduction:  Global Governance 
and Global Administrative Law in the International Legal Order, 17 EUR. J. INT’L. 1, 1 
(2006) (arguing that “globalization and the rise of global governance are transforming the 
structure of international law . . . the distinction between domestic and international law 
becomes more precarious”). 
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States are increasingly interconnected and interdependent:  
each state must perform actions that have both domestic and interna-
tional components and functions.105  State actions that are regulated 
by interconnected international and domestic provisions include, at a 
minimum: 
• Defense and justice:  increase border patrols; collabo-
ration to combat transnational criminal activities; anti-
terrorism activities; extradition and judicial collabora-
tion; the development and implementation of rules to 
curb human, arms, and drug trafficking; and immigra-
tion policies; 
• Public health:  directed at controlling safety and hy-
giene, the containment of epidemics and other emer-
gencies, health hazards and diseases for both humans 
and animals, the regulation of environmental trans-
boundary activities, agricultural and veterinary im-
ports and exports; 
• Commerce and trade:  include banking and financial 
services, custom regulations, trade and investment 
measures, collection of duties, and commercial and 
trade permits; 
• Transport and communication:  include the obligations 
to grant and provide safety in national airspace; con-
trol of coasts and maritime zones; and access to ports, 
roads, and railways.  Other included activities relate to 
postal, radio, telephone, satellite, and electronic com-
munications; and 
• Diplomatic and representative functions:  increase rep-
resentations at international and multilateral posts and 
conferences; diplomatic and consular services; recep-
tion of foreign diplomats; and consular officers.106 
Given the number of issues that are regulated by both interna-
tional and domestic laws, a post-conflict process that lacks an inter-
national law component also ignores fundamental consequences of a 
state’s activities.  For these reasons, and as discussed below, Somalia 
needs to reenter the web of inter-state and international private rela-
tions created and regulated by international law to fully recover from 
conflict. 
Another important role that international law can play in the 
reconstruction of post-conflict countries is to offer guidance by indi-
 
 105. GIORGETTI, A PRINCIPLED APPROACH, supra note 5, at 1–8. 
 106. Id. at 5. 
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cating core and priority issues for action.  Because of the complexity 
of contemporary relations, it can be challenging to acquire and main-
tain an overview of the priorities and functions that states need to ex-
ecute.  This problem is compounded in post-conflict situations, where 
governments also need to reengage in many domestic and interna-
tional functions, which they used to perform, but either ceased to per-
form or lack the capacity to fully perform because of the conflict.107  
Referring to existing international law can be especially useful to 
highlight the means needed to reengage with the international com-
munity and to accomplish identified priorities. 
C. Somalia and International Law 
Somalia is party to 209 bilateral and multilateral treaties.108  
These treaties include the Charter of the U.N. and regulate issues like 
privileges and immunities, diplomatic and consular relations, human 
rights, refugees, narcotic drugs, health, international trade and devel-
opment, transport and communications, navigation, educational and 
cultural matters, the status of women, criminal matters, the law of the 
sea, telecommunications, disarmament, the environment, and fiscal 
matters.109 
More specifically, these treaties address fundamental topics 
such as human rights, including the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights and the International Convention on the Elimina-
tion of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.  They further include 
treaties on environmental protection, such as the Basel Convention 
on the Control of Trans-boundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes 
and their Disposal and the Convention on Biological Diversity and 
the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer.  
Somalia is also a party to the primary treaties related to diplomatic 
and consular activities:  the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Rela-
tions and the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations.  Somalia is 
likewise a member of several international organizations and is a par-
ty to the U.N. Convention on the Law of Sea (UNCLOS).  It has rati-
fied several bilateral agreements on financial cooperation. 
 
 107. In many cases, newly nominated Ministers have little or no help to implement their 
strategies and there are too few civil servants. 
 108. See U.N. Treaty Collection, Somalia’s Treaties, https://treaties.un.org/pages/UNTS 
Online.aspx?id=3 (last visited Nov. 11, 2014) (select “Somalia” under Historical/Existing 
Values; then click “Search”). 
 109. U.N. Treaty Collection, Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General 
(last visited Nov. 2, 2014) https://treaties.un.org/pages/ParticipationStatus.aspx. 
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Since its establishment, the SFG itself has demonstrated an 
interest in international law through both its domestic and interna-
tional actions.  Domestically, Somalia’s Provisional Constitution, 
adopted on August 1, 2012,110 contains several references to interna-
tional law principles.  For example, Article 41 requires the Federal 
Parliament to establish a Human Rights Commission as an independ-
ent body.  Its objective is to promote understanding of human rights, 
set implementation standards and parameters for the fulfillment of 
human rights obligations, monitor human rights protections within 
Somalia, and investigate allegations of human rights violations.111  In 
the application of Article 41, a draft law was presented for discussion 
to the Somali Parliament in the Summer 2013.112  Similarly, Article 7 
states that any international boundaries dispute should be resolved in 
accordance with international law. 
Internationally, the SFG was keen to retake control of the 
Somali airspace soon after its establishment, which encompasses a 
large strategic section that is crossed by both north-south flights from 
Europe to Africa and east-west flights from Africa to Asia.113  During 
the civil war, and from 1992 to 2013, the airspace of Somalia was 
managed by an International Civil Aviation Organization 
(ICAO)/U.N. Development Programme (UNDP) project based in 
Nairobi, which controlled civil aviation and collected overflying 
fees.114  Issues that needed to be resolved included the location of the 
main air traffic control facilities and fee-sharing arrangements with 
the breakaway province of Somaliland.  In May 2013, Somali Minis-
ter for Information Ellmoge announced that, after nineteen years, 
 
 110. PROVISIONAL CONSTITUTION (Som.). 
 111. Id. ch. 2, art. 41 (Som.) (stating that “(1) The Federal Parliament shall establish a 
Human Rights Commission that is independent of State control, and has adequate resources 
to carry out its functions effectively.  (2) The functions of the Human Rights Commissions 
shall include the promotion of knowledge of human rights, and specifically Shari’ah, setting 
implementation standards and parameters for the fulfillment of human rights obligations, 
monitoring human rights within the country, and investigating allegations of human rights 
violations”). 
 112. Draft Law (2013) (on file with the author).  The law made no reference to 
international human rights standards.  Additionally, similarly to the functions of the Human 
Rights Commission, Somalia’s human rights treaties obligations require monitoring and 
investigation of human rights violations. 
 113. See Flight Information Region Map, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION 
ORGANIZATION, http://gis.icao.int/appsilver/ICAOFIR2014/ (last visited Nov. 2, 2014) 
(select “WORLD ROUTE 2014/UPP Routes op 2014/NAVH”; then zoom in on “FIR 
MOGADISHU HC SM”). 
 114. GIORGETTI, A PRINCIPLED APPROACH, supra note 5, at 31. 
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Somalia had regained control over its airspace.115  The plan was in 
compliance with ICAO requirements and provided for a fee-sharing 
agreement between Somaliland and Somalia. 
Interestingly, the new government of Somalia also acceded to 
the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).  On May 29, 2013, it de-
posited its instrument of accession to the CWC with the U.N. Secre-
tary-General.116  “After thirty days, the Convention entered into force 
for the country, making Somalia the 189th State Party to the trea-
ty.”117 
Given the nature and extent of Somalia’s international obliga-
tions, post-conflict reconstruction must include an explicit interna-
tional law component, which is now missing.  Somalia’s post-conflict 
priorities cannot be properly addressed without applying and explicit-
ly referring to international law.  In fact, increased globalization and 
the interconnectedness of states’ actions mean that international law 
necessarily plays an increasingly important role in all of a state’s ac-
tivities, including post-conflict reconstruction.118 
III. USING INTERNATIONAL LAW IN SOMALIA’S RECONSTRUCTION 
The section above demonstrates that, although no overarching 
international legal framework is specifically applicable to post-
conflict reconstruction, international law permeates all actions by 
states and private parties, from trade to immigration and from food 
safety to travel.119  Post-conflict reconstruction requires a sophisticat-
ed approach by sophisticated users.  International law can mandate 
resolution frameworks and provide analyses that can assist in under-
standing complexity.120  Furthermore, reconstruction efforts require 
 
 115. Somalia Regains Control over Its Air Space, ALLAFRICA (May 13, 2013), 
http://allafrica.com/stories/201305140319.html. 
 116. Somalia Joins the Chemical Weapons Convention, ORGANISATION FOR THE 
PROHIBITION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS (May 31, 2013), http://www.opcw.org/news/ 
article/somalia-joins-the-chemical-weapons-convention/ (“On 29 May 2013, Somalia 
deposited its instrument of accession to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) with the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations. . . .  This will reduce to seven the number of States 
that have not yet joined.”). 
 117. The CWC is a widely ratified convention:  Only seven countries have not yet 
joined.  Id. 
 118. See GIORGETTI, A PRINCIPLED APPROACH, supra note 5, at 4–6. 
 119. Id. ch. 1. 
 120. American Society of International Law, Washington, D.C., Mar. 28–31, 2012, 
106th Annual Meeting Final Program:  Confronting Complexity, available at http://www. 
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coordination with efficient international instruments.121 
By including an international law component in post-conflict 
priorities, international law can provide a framework for action and 
best practices.  These translate into specific items to facilitate the re-
construction in Somalia in its identified priorities.  This section high-
lights three specific examples of how international law can address 
the three priorities—security, economic development, and human 
rights—discussed above and identified by the SFG.  First, as a tool to 
strengthen security, international law can provide a framework to as-
sist in the delimitation of maritime boundaries by using principles 
found in the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea.  Second, as a 
way to meet the economic goals, international law can provide issues 
for action and encourage economic development through the negotia-
tion of international investment treaties.  Third, as an instrument to 
implement the transitional justice and human rights priority, interna-
tional law transitional justice examples can be used as best practices 
to identify instruments to foster reconciliation in Somalia. 
A. Security Objectives:  International Law Can Mandate a 
Framework for Action to Delimit Maritime Borders 
As discussed above, one of the main security priorities con-
fronting Somalia is the delimitation of the maritime border in the In-
dian Ocean.122  International law can provide a framework to imme-
diately assist in the negotiation process and to facilitate a binding 
delimitation of its maritime boundaries. 
The primary dispute exists between Somalia and Kenya and is 
now being fueled by natural resources.123  In fact, a contested mari-
 
asil.org/sites/default/files/ASIL_ANNUAL_MEETING_Program_2012.pdf. 
 121. See U.N. PEACEBUILDING COMM’N, supra note 83. 
 122. See supra Part I. 
 123. The dispute became evident during a weekly SFG council of ministers gathering on 
June 6, 2013, where officials discussed Somalia’s maritime borders.  At the meeting, the 
ministers “had agreed to make ‘null and void’ the 2009 maritime borders Memorandum of 
Understanding (MOU) between Kenya and Somalia’s now-defunct Transitional Federal 
Government (TFG).  Adding fuel to the fire, the Somali Government, led by President 
Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, officially ‘extended’ the country’s sea territory by 200 nautical 
miles, and also defined the continental shelf as part of its maritime boundary.”  Cassie 
Blombaum, Stirring the Somali Waters:  Toward a Maritime Oil War?, INKERMAN INSIGHTS 
ON GLOBAL BUSINESS THREAT AND VOLATILITY (June 10, 2013), 
http://blog.inkerman.com/index.php/2013/06/10/stirring-the-somalia-waters-toward-a-
maritime-oil-war/; Kim Moss, Somali-Kenya Maritime Boundary Dispute Remains 
Unresolved, FUTURE DIRECTIONS INTERNATIONAL (June 12, 2013), 
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time zone that both Kenya and Somalia claim may have the potential 
for oil exploration.  Kenya identified several new offshore explora-
tion blocks available for licensing, and all but one are located in the 
contested area in the Indian Ocean.124  Private companies have ap-
proached both governments.  Reportedly, French firm Total and Tex-
as-based Anadarko obtained exploration licenses from Kenya for 
blocks in the disputed area.125  At the same time, a Somali minister 
reportedly granted similar rights to another foreign company.126  To 
make matters even more complicated, separate concessions for both 
on-land and off-shore drilling have allegedly been granted by a high 
official in the Puntland administration.127  In January 2013, the Cana-
dian company Africa Oil began its first on-shore drilling operation in 
Somalia.  Africa Oil estimated that its two drilling blocks could in-
clude reserves of up to four billion barrels, worth about $500 billion 
at today’s prices.128 
The exact amount of hydrocarbon reserves in the contested 
maritime region are, of course, unknown.  Initial reports, however, 
estimate that the combined onshore and offshore reserves could be 
 
http://www.futuredirections.org.au/publications/energy-security/27-energy-security-
swa/1091-somali-kenya-maritime-boundary-dispute-remains-unresolved.html. 
 124. Kelly Gilblom, Kenya/Somalia Border Row Threatens Oil Exploration, REUTERS, 
Apr. 20, 2012, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/20/us-kenya-exploration-
idUSBRE 83J0M120120420. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Troubled Somalia Hustles Big Oil To Resume Exploration, UPI (Oct. 16, 2013, 
12:58 PM), http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Energy-Resources/2013/10/16/Troubled-
Somalia-hustles-Big-Oil-to-resume-exploration/UPI-31691381942688/ (reporting that 
“Abdullah Haidar of Somalia’s Ministry of Natural Resources reported recently that 
discussions in London with the major oil companies, including Conoco Phillips, Chevron 
Corp. and Eni of Italy, ‘are going well’” and that “[t]he only Western company to sign up 
with Mogadishu so far is the British company Soma Oil & Gas, established in 2012 and 
headed by Lord Michael Howard, a former Conservative Party leader who’s held several 
cabinet posts.  It signed an agreement Aug. 6 and will conduct seismic surveys in designated 
areas on land and offshore, and update historic seismic data for the government, in return for 
nominating exploration and drilling rights for up to 12 blocks”). 
 127. See Alexis Flyn & Justin Scheck, Somalia Seeks to Restart Oil Exploration, WALL 
ST. J., Oct. 7, 2013, available at http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB100014240527 
02303442004579121310761917156?mod=_newsreel_2 (reporting that “[a] number of small 
companies have signed oil-exploration deals with regional authorities in Somalia, raising 
tensions with the central government.  The only company to sign an agreement with the 
central government is private startup Soma Oil & Gas Ltd., which is conducting early-stage 
data collection, its chief executive, Robert Sheppard, said in an interview last month”). 
 128. Somalia’s Oil Prospects Add New Dangers, UPI (March 1, 2012, 3:53 PM), 
http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Energy-Resources/2012/03/01/Somalias-oil-prospects-
add-new-dangers/UPI-81601330635213/. 
2014] USING INTERNATIONAL LAW IN SOMALIA 79 
 
substantial, and could amount to as much as 110 billion barrels of 
oil.129  The development of natural resources in Somalia could there-
fore be a turnaround for Somalia’s development and could bring 
much needed revenue.  At the heart of the matter is how to demarcate 
the maritime boundary that lies between Somalia and Kenya.  Kenya 
claims that the maritime boundary should run east from the point 
where the territorial border ends.  Somalia claims that the border con-
tinues diagonally southeast into the Indian Ocean, following the gen-
eral direction of the territorial border (see Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1:  Contested Region between 
Somalia and Kenya* 
 
Clearly, an arrangement to delimit the Somalia-Kenya mari-
time border would be key to ensuring the successful development of 
 
 129. Id. 
 * Original figure from Blombaum, supra note 123. 
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offshore resources.  Without assurances that the maritime borders are 
finally delimited, however, oil companies may not invest in explora-
tion and research and thus possible revenues will not be produced.  
Indeed, the ongoing dispute over their maritime boundary has already 
deterred interest in developing the offshore blocks.130  It is thus cru-
cial to both Somalia and Kenya that their border dispute be re-
solved.131  In fact, the U.N. has also warned that Western commercial 
oil exploration in the disputed areas, as well as existing discrepancies 
over which authorities could issue licenses, “could spark further con-
flict.”132  The U.N. experts were also concerned about a request by 
Norway to Somalia to implement an Exclusive Economic Zone 
(EEZ) off its coast, which they highlighted may be connected with 
commercial interests held by a Norwegian oil company.133 
International law provides the necessary instruments and 
frameworks to resolve the dispute finally and satisfactorily.  Both 
Somalia and Kenya are parties to UNCLOS, which they both ratified 
in 1989.134  UNCLOS includes detailed provisions on how to regulate 
 
 130. The U.N. Monitoring Group reports that Kenya suspended a concession to a 
Norwegian company because of the ongoing dispute.  See Michelle Nichols & Louis 
Charbonneau, Exclusive: Western Oil Exploration in Somalia May Spark Conflict—U.N. 
Report, REUTERS, July 17, 2013, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/17/us-
somalia-oil-un-idUSBRE96G06R20130717 (“The U.N. report said late last year that Kenya 
had suspended Statoil’s license for block L26 because the Norwegian company did not want 
to spend money on exploration while there was the legal uncertainty over the maritime 
border with Somalia.”). 
 131. See Moss, supra note 123 (explaining that “one of the most important issues arising 
from the inability of the two countries to come to an agreement on their maritime boundary, 
is that their legal claims to sell exploration blocks and collect revenue from any subsequent 
discoveries, are at risk.  Kenya’s Petroleum Energy Commissioner, Martin Heya, has 
previously confirmed that companies awarded exploration rights in the contested area, will 
be unable to begin exploration/drilling until the boundary dispute is settled, as it is unclear 
which country will receive the revenue from any subsequent resource discoveries. . . .  This 
comes at an unfortunate time, because the wider East Africa region has attracted 
considerable international interest and most importantly, promises of investment, following 
large discoveries of oil and natural gas”). 
 132. See Nichols & Charbonneau, supra note 130. 
 133. Id. (stating “[e]fforts by Norway to lobby Somali officials to adopt the EEZ now 
coincide with current Norwegian interest in the fate of L26 [blocks which are contested with 
Kenya] as well as with Norwegian involvement in the application of a Special Financing 
Facility donor fund of $30 million which has been allocated under the management of 
[Somali government] officials with a track record of corruption”).  
 134. Somalia ratified the Convention on July 24, 1989, and Kenya ratified it on March 
2, 1989.  See U.N. Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, Chronological Lists of 
Ratifications Of, Accessions and Successions to the Convention and the Related Agreements 
as at 3 October 2014 [sic] (Oct. 3, 2014), http://www.un.org/depts/los/reference_files/ 
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boundaries in specific sections of the sea.  Using UNCLOS as a 
framework to resolve the maritime dispute is useful in at least two 
ways.  First, UNCLOS provides recognized principles to resolve the 
substance of the dispute.  Second, UNCLOS provides a way to re-
solve disputes by a binding decision, should inter-state negotiations 
fail to reach an agreement. 
UNCLOS provides that the sovereignty of a coastal state ex-
tends to the territorial sea up to a limit not exceeding twelve nautical 
miles, measured from the baselines determined in accordance with 
provisions of the Convention itself.135  The Convention also provides 
for the establishment of an EEZ defined as “an area beyond and adja-
cent to the territorial sea” and subject to a specific legal regime estab-
lished by the Convention.  The legal regime governs the rights and 
jurisdiction of the coastal state and the rights and freedoms of other 
states.136 
The EEZ is limited to 200 nautical miles from the state’s 
baselines.  In the EEZ, the coastal state retains: 
[S]overeign rights for the purpose of exploring and 
exploiting, conserving and managing natural resources 
whether living and non-living, of the waters superja-
cent to the seabed and of the seabed and its subsoil, 
and with regard to other activities for the economic 
exploitation and exploration of the zone, such as the 
production of energy from the water, currents and 
winds.137 
UNCLOS also defines the obligations applicable to the conti-
nental shelf, which comprises “the seabed and subsoil of the subma-
rine areas”138 that extend beyond the territorial sea and through the 
natural prolongation of the territory to the outer edge of the continen-
tal margin, or a distance of two hundred nautical miles from the base-
lines if the outer edge of the continental margin does not extend to 
that distance.139  Under UNCLOS, the coastal state exercises sover-
 
chronological_lists_of_ratifications.htm. 
 135. See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 3, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 
U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter UNCLOS]. 
 136. Id. art. 55. 
 137. Id. art. 56(1)(a); see id. art. 55 (governing the specific legal regime of the exclusive 
economic zone); id. art. 56 (governing the rights, jurisdiction, and duties of the coastal state 
in the exclusive economic zone); id. art. 76 (governing the definition of the continental 
shelf); id. art. 83 (governing the delimitation of the continental shelf between States with 
opposite or adjacent coasts). 
 138. Id. art. 75. 
 139. Id. 
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eign rights of exploration and exploitation of its natural resources 
over the continental shelf.140  It also maintains an exclusive right to 
authorize and regulate drilling of the continental shelf for all purpos-
es.141 
Importantly, UNCLOS provides means to delimit both the 
EEZ and the continental shelf for states with adjacent coasts, as is the 
case between Somalia and Kenya.142  The relevant provisions refer to 
Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, which 
indicates the appropriate international legal instruments to be used to 
resolve the dispute.143  The provision also signals that an equitable 
solution should be achieved.144  Pending agreement, the states con-
cerned shall make every effort to enter into provisional arrangements 
of a practical nature in a spirit of understanding and cooperation.  
During the transitional period, the states shall not jeopardize or ham-
per the conclusion of the final agreement.  These arrangements are 
without prejudice to the final delimitation.  Interestingly, Kenya 
claims that such a provisional arrangement exists and was signed as a 
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) in April 2009 with the TFG, 
a previous incarnation of the SFG.145  Somalia, however, has main-
tained that the MoU is invalid and registered its rejection of the MoU 
with the U.N. Secretariat in March 2010.146 
 
 140. Id. art. 77. 
 141. Id. art. 81. 
 142. Id. arts. 74, 83 (governing the EEZ and the continental shelf respectively). 
 143. Id.; see Statute of the International Court of Justice, 1946 I.C.J. art. 38 (“The Court, 
whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such disputes as are 
submitted to it, shall apply:  (a) international conventions, whether general or particular, 
establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting states; (b) international custom, as 
evidence of a general practice accepted as law; (c) the general principles of law recognized 
by civilized nations; (d) subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the 
teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means 
for the determination of rules of law.  This provision shall not prejudice the power of the 
Court to decide a case ex aequo et bono, if the parties agree thereto.”). 
 144. UNCLOS, arts. 74, 83. 
 145. See Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the Republic of 
Kenya and the Transitional Federal Government of the Somali Republic to Grant to Each 
Other No-Objection in Respect of Submissions on the Outer Limits of the Continental Shelf 
beyond 200 Nautical Miles to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, 
Kenya-Som., Apr. 7, 2009, 2599 U.N.T.S. 35; Blombaum, supra note 123. 
 146. U.N. Division of Ocean Affairs and Law of the Sea, Somalia (July 17, 2014), 
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/STATEFILES/SOM.htm 
(“By a note verbale dated 2 March 2010, the Permanent Mission of the Somali Republic to 
the United Nations informed the Secretariat that the MOU had been rejected by the 
Parliament of the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia, and ‘is to be hence treated as 
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The framework provided by UNCLOS can thus fruitfully 
guide the negotiation for the delimitation of the maritime borders be-
tween Somalia and Kenya.  Pursuant to the rules governing the terri-
torial sea, the EEZ, and the continental shelf under UNCLOS, Kenya 
and Somalia could reach an agreement that is based on the principles 
and sources of international law.  UNCLOS also provides that an eq-
uitable solution should be achieved, with the interests of both parties 
taken into consideration.  Pending the agreement, both parties should 
refrain from taking any actions that could jeopardize and hamper the 
final agreement and should act in a spirit of cooperation and under-
standing.  These guiding principles provide each party with an im-
portant framework for negotiation.  They also allow for the same 
guiding principles to be used by both parties, and thus clarify parties’ 
expected behavior and provide a level playing field. 
Further, if no agreement is reached within a reasonable period 
of time, UNCLOS can guide the process to a legally binding agree-
ment decided by a neutral arbitral tribunal.147  Part XV of UNCLOS 
provides an efficient dispute resolution mechanism through a binding 
international arbitration process administered by the Permanent Court 
of Arbitration, to which both Kenya and Somalia have access.148  
This binding process has been used successfully on several occa-
sions.  For example, in the arbitration between Guyana and Suri-
name, the arbitral tribunal was also confronted with a request to de-
marcate the territorial sea, the EEZ and the continental shelf between 
the two adjacent claims of Guyana and Suriname.  Both claimed an 
overlapping area for which they had both given exploration conces-
sions.149  Ultimately, the arbitral tribunal delimited the maritime bor-
der applying the provisional equidistance line approved by the par-
ties.150 
By encouraging the use of the international law framework 
provided by UNCLOS, Somalia could address the fundamental issue 
 
non-actionable.’”). 
 147. UNCLOS, arts. 74, 83. 
 148. Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, The International Tribunal for the Law of the 
Sea, in THE RULES, PRACTICE, AND JURISPRUDENCE OF INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND 
TRIBUNALS 115 (Chiara Giorgetti ed., 2012). 
 149. Guyana v. Suriname, 139 I.L.R. 566 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2007). 
 150. Id. ¶¶ 392–400.  Note that in that situation, oil explorations had begun and, in the 
view of the tribunal, Suriname had threatened to use force on an oil rig and drill ship that 
had permission from Guyana and which Suriname claimed was within its jurisdiction.  Id. ¶¶ 
435–39.  For another interesting case, see The Government of the State of Eritrea v. the 
Government of the Republic of Yemen, Award of the Arbitral Tribuinal in the Second Stage 
of the Proceeding (Maritime Delimitation), 119 I.L.R. 417 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1999). 
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of maritime boundary delimitation with Kenya. This will be im-
portant for economic development, security issues, and the restora-
tion of a good relationship with an important neighbor.  Moreover, 
because both Somalia and Kenya are parties to UNCLOS, if they fail 
to find an agreement by consent, both have access to a binding dis-
pute resolution mechanism that can effectively resolve the issue and 
delimit the maritime border once and for all. 
In addition to providing useful and mandatory frameworks for 
action, international law can also indicate priorities and issues for ac-
tion that are particularly important for post-conflict reconstruction. 
B. Economic Objectives:  International Law Can Offer Core Issues 
for Action for Economic Development 
A second key priority identified by the SFG is economic re-
covery, which is generally key in post-conflict situations.151  Provid-
ing means of economic growth is crucial to ensuring a successful and 
sustainable reconstruction and it is an integral part of a comprehen-
sive restructuring and stabilization effort.152  Economic growth pro-
grams not only enhance the well-being of the general population, but 
can also reduce the risk of returning to conflict.153 
Somalia is one of the poorest countries in the world, with one 
of the lowest GDPs per capita.  Ensuring the flow of foreign direct 
investment is particularly important to stimulate economic recov-
ery.154  To attract international investment, it is vital to provide an 
environment that welcomes investments and adequately addresses the 
 
 151. Paul Collier & Anke Hoeffler, Aid, Policy and Growth in Post-Conflict Societies 1 
(World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 2902, 2002), available at 
http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/pdf/10.1596/1813-9450-2902 (“We find that during the 
first three post-conflict years absorptive capacity is no greater than normal, but that in the 
rest of the first decade it is approximately double its normal level.”); see THE SOMALI 
COMPACT, supra note 46; SECURING PEACE:  STATE-BUILDING AND ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT IN POST-CONFLICT COUNTRIES (Richard Kozul-Wright and Piergiuseppe 
Fortunato eds., 2011). 
 152. U.S. AGENCY FOR INT’L DEV. OFFICE OF ECON. GROWTH, A GUIDE TO ECONOMIC 
GROWTH IN POST-CONFLICT COUNTRIES VI (2009). 
 153. Id. (“The purpose of economic growth programming in post-conflict countries is 
both to reduce the risk of a return to conflict and to accelerate the improvement of well-
being for everyone, particularly the conflict-affected population.”). 
 154. THE WORLD BANK, INVESTING ACROSS BORDERS 2010:  INDICATORS OF FOREIGN 
DIRECT INVESTMENT REGULATION IN 87 ECONOMIES 1 (2010). 
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concerns of investors while protecting their interests.155  To ensure 
such an environment and demonstrate their commitment to economic 
stability, many capital-importing countries have participated in the 
negotiation of bilateral or multilateral international investment trea-
ties (IIAs) with capital-exporting countries.156 
IIAs are international agreements that regulate the conditions 
for private investments by national and foreign companies.157  Typi-
cally, they provide a number of guarantees to investors, including 
protection from expropriation, fair and equitable treatment, free 
transfers of means and full protection and security.  An important and 
distinctive feature of many IIAs is to provide a specific and alterna-
tive dispute resolution mechanism, which allows recourse to interna-
tional arbitration rather than the use of domestic courts in case of an 
alleged violation of the investment treaty.  Most often, international 
investment arbitration occurs under the arbitration rules of the Inter-
national Convention for the Settlement of Investment Disputes 
(ICSID) or of the United National Commission on International 
Trade Law (UNCITRAL). 
In the specific case of Somalia, the negotiations of IIAs 
would be particularly important, especially to foster and reengage re-
lations with key trade partners.  Before the beginning of the civil war, 
Somalia had entered into Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs), name-
ly with Germany and Egypt.158  Since 1985, however, it has not ne-
 
 155. See U.N. Conference on Trade and Dev., World Investment Report 2013:  Global 
Value Chains:  Investment and Trade for Development (2013), http://unctad.org/ 
en/publicationslibrary/wir2013_en.pdf (concluding that developing countries have taken the 
lead in attracting foreign direct investment and that “[m]ost governments are keen to attract 
and facilitate foreign investment as a means for productive capacity-building and sustainable 
development”). 
 156. Id. (“By the end of 2012, the regime of international investment agreements (IIAs) 
consisted of 3,196 treaties.  Today, countries increasingly favor a regional over a bilateral 
approach to IIA rulemaking and taking into account sustainable development elements.”). 
 157. See RUDOLF DOLZER & CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT LAW 6–8 (2d ed. 2008); see generally U.N. Conference on Trade and Dev., 
World Investment Report 2006:  FDI from Developing and Transition Economies: 
Implications for Development (2006), http://unctad.org/en/Docs/wir2006_en.pdf (discussing 
BITs); U.N. Conference on Trade and Dev., World Investment Report 2004:  The Shift 
Towards Services (2004), http://unctad.org/en/Docs/wir2004_en.pdf (discussing the 
Canadian model BIT). 
 158. U.N. Conference on Trade and Dev., Bilateral Investment Treaties Signed by 
Somalia (June 1, 2013), http://unctad.org/Sections/dite_pcbb/docs/bits_somalia.pdf 
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gotiated, signed, or ratified any new BITs and has remained com-
pletely excluded from the international investment arbitration move-
ment. 
The negotiation and drafting of IIAs by Somalia can be in-
formed by existing IIAs and their interpretation by international arbi-
tral tribunals.  The principles that are included in existing IIAs could 
be used by the Somali government as priorities for consideration and 
for possible inclusion in IIAs signed by Somalia.  Some of the most 
common IIA principles are included in Figure 2.  They could serve as 
an initial negotiation starting point and blueprint for discussions with 
other interested parties. 
Figure 2:  Sample Negotiating Blueprint 
Negotiation principle Observations Conclusions 
Bilateral or regional ap-
proach? 
  
Applicable law?   
Definition of investment?   
Confidentiality?   
Type of expropriation pro-
tection? 
  
Definition of fair and equi-
table treatment 
  
Full protection and securi-
ty 
  
Include umbrella clause?    
Provide national treat-
ment? 
  
Provide Most Favored Na-
tion Treatment? 
  
Allow ICSID Arbitration?   
 
 
(reporting that Somalia concluded a BIT with Egypt on May 29, 1982 (which entered into 
force on April 16, 1983) and with Germany on Nov. 27, 1981 (which entered into force on 
February 15, 1985)). 
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At the same time, joining the ICSID Convention would guar-
antee an efficient and neutral binding international dispute resolution 
mechanism.  Thus, any IIA signed by Somalia should include a bind-
ing international dispute resolution mechanism through international 
arbitration.  This would be also an important signal to potential inves-
tors. 
Using international law to identify priorities offers an im-
portant tool to structure post-conflict reconstruction.  The example of 
IIAs, identified above, would be particularly important to ensure 
economic reconstruction and to stimulate foreign investment. 
C. Human Rights and Transitional Justice Objective:  International 
Law Can Offer Examples of Best Practices 
A third way in which international law can assist in post-
conflict reconstruction of Somalia is by providing examples of best 
practices, particularly for transitional justice issues, thus promoting 
the third priority identified in Part I.159  Addressing and resolving is-
sues of accountability for human rights violations is fundamental in 
order to guarantee stability in post-conflict situations.160  Transitional 
justice mechanisms consolidate peace, foster social and national re-
construction, and secure long-term peace.161 
Somalia’s Provisional Constitution mandates the creation of a 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission to “foster national healing, 
reconciliation and unity” and to ensure that “matters relating to im-
punity, revenge and other triggers of violence are addressed through 
a legal and state-directed process.”162  The Commission has not yet 
been established.  At this point, therefore, other past examples can be 
 
 159. See supra Part I. 
 160. U.N. Secretary-General, The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and 
Post-Conflict Societies, Summary, U.N. Doc. S/2004/616 (Aug. 23, 2004) (stating that 
“recent years have seen an increased focus by the United Nations on questions of transitional 
justice and the rules of law in conflict and post-conflict societies, yielding important lessons 
for our future activities”). 
 161. Id. ¶ 2 (stating “our experience in the past decade has demonstrated clearly that the 
consolidation of peace in the immediate post-conflict period, as well as the maintenance of 
peace in the long term, cannot be achieved unless the population is confident that redress for 
grievances can be obtained through legitimate structures for the peaceful settlement of 
disputes and the fair administration of justice”). 
 162. See PROVISIONAL CONSTITUTION (Som.). 
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particularly useful to guide the creation of the Commission and struc-
ture a comprehensive and effective transitional justice process in 
Somalia. 
Transitional justice has become an important part of all rec-
onciliation processes.  In addition to truth and reconciliation commis-
sions, other transitional justice instruments include international ad 
hoc tribunals, hybrid tribunals, domestic courts, and the International 
Criminal Court (ICC).  More than one instrument is often imple-
mented in transitional justice processes.163  Assessing precedents can 
serve as best-practice examples for Somalia and can be an important 
tool to develop the best transitional mechanism for Somalia.164 
Indeed, international law and transitional justice provide a re-
al menu of options that could be used as examples for Somalia to de-
velop its own transitional justice mechanism in application of the 
Provisional Constitution. 
The main goals of each transitional justice process vary.  Spe-
cific goals are intrinsically linked to the nature of the conflict and 
post-conflict priorities.  Figure 3 identifies the main means and dif-
ferent goals of each transitional justice mechanism, and can also 
serve as a template to assess best practices.165 
  
 
 163. For an introduction, see International Center for Transitional Justice, Fact Sheet:  
What is Transitional Justice? (2009), http://www.ictj.org/sites /default/files/ICTJ-Global-
Transitional-Justice-2009-English.pdf. 
 164. Margherita Zuin, A Model of Transitional Justice for Somalia, 23 FLETCHER J. 
HUM. SECURITY 89 (2008). 
 165. This is adapted from DAVID LUBAN, JULIE R. O’SULLIVAN & DAVID P. STEWART, 
INTERNATIONAL AND TRANSNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW (2009). 
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Figure 3:  Goals and Means of Transitional  
Justice Mechanisms 
 Int’l 
Tribu-
nals 
Hybrid 
Tribu-
nals 
Nat’l 
Courts 
Local 
justice  
Lustra-
tion/Com
pensation 
TRCs 
Retribution       
Deterrence       
Creating a record       
Social healing       
Individual healing        
Due process       
Rebuilding rule of 
law 
      
 
In terms of possible transitional justice mechanisms, several 
choices are available.  First, international criminal tribunals are avail-
able.  The early 1990s witnessed one of the most significant recent 
developments in international criminal law with the creation of two 
ad hoc international criminal tribunals and the establishment of a 
permanent international criminal court.  The International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) were created by U.N. Security 
Council Resolutions.166  These Tribunals have specific and primary 
jurisdiction.  The ICTY has jurisdiction over crimes committed on 
the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991, and specifically 
grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, violations of the laws or 
customs of war, genocide, and crimes against humanity.167  The 
 
 166. Procedurally, the Security Council first created two commissions of experts, both 
of which, after examining the evidence, suggested the creation of ad hoc tribunals.  Both the 
ICTY and ICTR were created by Security Council resolutions adopted under U.N. Charter 
Chapter VII.  See S.C. Res. 827, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993) and S.C. Res. 955, 
U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994), respectively, which are binding for all U.N. members.  
The tribunals are both subsidiary, although independent, organs of the Security Council.  
The ICTR is structurally linked to the ICTY, sharing the same Prosecutor, Appeal 
Chambers, and prosecutorial staff. 
 167. See generally U.N. International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 
http://www.icty.org (last visited Sept. 23, 2014). 
90 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW [53:48 
 
ICTR has jurisdiction over the crime of genocide and other serious 
violations of international law committed in Rwanda, or by Rwandan 
citizens in nearby states, between January 1 and December 31, 
1994.168  The establishment of the ICTY and the ICTR led, to a cer-
tain extent, to the creation of the ICC. 
The ICC is the first permanent, treaty-based international 
criminal court established to prosecute the most serious crimes of in-
ternational concern, for example, genocide, crimes against humanity, 
and war crimes.  The ICC is a court of last resort and its jurisdiction 
is retrospective only.  The ICC is based on the 1998 Rome Statute, 
which had 122 states parties as of November 24, 2014.  Somalia has 
not ratified the treaty and is therefore not a party to the ICC.  The 
ICC does not have jurisdiction over Somalia.  Because of the exist-
ence of the ICC, additional ad hoc international criminal tribunals 
would be hard to justify.  However, given the unique situation of 
Somalia, it is possible that sufficient political will may be summoned. 
Second, hybrid criminal tribunals are available.  They incor-
porate both international and national elements.169  Typically, a ma-
jority of the judges are international judges, and principles of interna-
tional criminal law apply.  At the same time, national judges 
complement the court and specific principles of domestic law may 
also apply.  Generally, hybrid tribunals sit in the country in which 
 
 168. See generally U.N. International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, http://www. 
unictr.org (last visited Sept. 23, 2014). 
 169. In the aftermath of the U.N.-brokered 1999 Lomé Peace Agreement between the 
Sierra Leonean government and the Revolutionary United Front, and to begin a process of 
national reconciliation, the Government of Sierra Leone requested the U.N. to establish an 
international court to prosecute those responsible for committing atrocities during the war.  
With S.C. Res. 1315, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1315 (Aug. 14, 2000), the Security Council 
requested that the Secretary-General negotiate with the Government of Sierra Leone to 
create an independent special court.  In October 2000, the Secretary-General issued a report 
to the Security Council outlining the characteristics of the court.  The court is treaty-based 
and established by a special agreement between the U.N. and the government of Sierra 
Leone.  It has primacy over domestic prosecutions in Sierra Leone, but not in other states.  
The Court has jurisdiction over crimes against humanity, war crimes, and certain crimes 
under Sierra Leonean domestic criminal law.  It does not have competence over the crime of 
genocide.  The Court has personal jurisdiction over persons who bear the greatest 
responsibility for those crimes.  Its temporal jurisdiction began in 1996, the date of the first 
failed peace agreement between the two parties, not the beginning of the civil war in 1991.  
See U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the Establishment of a 
Special Court for Sierra Leone, U.N. Doc. S/2000/915 (Oct. 4, 2000). 
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they focus.  The tribunal’s staff includes both international and do-
mestic personnel.170 
Third, national courts are available.  They are often consid-
ered the forum of first resort to prosecute human rights abusers.171  
 
 170. For example, in the Sierra Leone tribunal, the Chief Prosecutor, the Registrar, as 
well as the majority of the Judges in both the Trial and Appeal Chambers are appointed by 
the U.N. Secretary-General.  See id. ¶¶ 47–48; see also id. Annex art. 2.  The government of 
Sierra Leone appointed the other judges as well as the Deputy Prosecutor.  Id. art. 3.  The 
only other existing example of a hybrid tribunal was the ones established in Cambodia.  See 
Cambodian Genocide Program:  Chronology, 1994-2004, YALE UNIV. (last visited Oct. 24, 
2014), http://www.yale.edu/cgp/chron_v3.html.  In July 2001, the Cambodian National 
Assembly passed the final legislation enabling the establishment of a tribunal in conjunction 
with the United Nations to try the former leaders of Khmer Rouge for genocide.  See id.  
Contrary to the Sierra Leone example, the majority of judges and prosecutors of the special 
tribunal for Cambodia will be Cambodian, while only a minority will be international staff.  
See Donald W. Beachler, The Quest for Justice in Cambodia:  Power, Politics, and the 
Khmer Rouge Tribunal, 8 GENOCIDE STUD. & PREVENTION 67, 69 (2013); see also 
Cambodia:  Background:  A Long Road to Justice, INT’L CENTER FOR TRANSITIONAL JUST. 
(Oct. 21, 2014), http://www.ictj.org/our-work/regions-and-countries/cambodia; Criminal 
Court for Cambodia:  Establishment of Extraordinary Chambers Responsible for the 
Prosecution of Crimes Committed by the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, TRIAL (June 6, 2014), 
http://www.trial-ch.org/en/resources/tribunals/hybrid-tribunals/criminal-court-for-
cambodia.html. 
 171. See Hum. Rts. Watch, The International Criminal Court:  How Nongovernmental 
Organizations Can Contribute to the Prosecution of War Criminals, 8 (2004), available at 
http://www.hrw.org/legacy/backgrounder/africa/icc0904/icc0904.pdf.  Recent cases of 
prosecution in national courts offer a mixed outcome, which becomes questionable 
especially in cases of prolonged mass abuses in poorer countries.  See generally LEGAL VICE 
PRESIDENCY, WORLD BANK, ETHIOPIA:  LEGAL AND JUDICIAL SECTOR ASSESSMENT (2004), 
available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTLAWJUSTINST/Resources/EthiopiaSA. 
pdf.  For example, the Ethiopian government announced its intention to bring to justice the 
officials of the previous regime for crimes committed by the Dergue between 1974 and 
1991, which included arbitrary detention, torture, disappearances, and extra-judicial 
executions.  See generally id.  The protracted civil conflict and history of repression 
debilitated its judicial system, which is weak and lacks a tradition of independence.  Id.  As a 
result, the number of cases and the amount of evidence are challenging the capacity and 
competence of the Ethiopian judicial system and its ability to impartially and effectively 
prosecute the cases heard before it.  Id.  A similar situation is found in Rwanda.  See 
AMNESTY INT’L, RWANDA:  THE TROUBLED COURSE OF JUSTICE (2000), available at 
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AFR47/010/2000/en/8c1fc 557-df6b-11dd-acaa-
7d9091d4638f/afr470102000en.pdf.  In the aftermath of the genocide of 1994, the Tutsi 
government began to try offenders.  Id.  Six years after the genocide in Rwanda, there were 
an estimated 125,000 people still in detention, including minors, the elderly, and the infirm.  
Id.  By January 2000, over 2,500 had been tried, several hundred of whom had been 
sentenced to death.  Id.  At this pace, it will take about 400 years to process them all.  
Rwanda suffers extreme poverty and has little tradition of judicial independence.  See id.  
Fear, insecurity, and a lack of personnel affect the proceedings.  Id.  Prisoners are often 
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Because they are close to the facts, the victims, and the evidence, 
courts of the state where the crimes were committed are at times con-
sidered the best and most inclusive form of accountability.  Often, 
however, in post-conflict situations such as in Somalia, an independ-
ent and skilled judiciary is lacking, and judges may have fled or may 
have been the target of abuses themselves.  Moreover, the judicial 
system may lack financial means and may be overwhelmed by the 
number of cases of a transitional justice process. 
Fourth, local justice is available.  The use of local or tradi-
tional methods of dispute resolution has become more common in 
situations where the national judicial system does not function 
properly.  Provided that basic rights are respected, local justice 
mechanisms could provide a good and locally-supported method to 
deal with past abuses outside national courtrooms.172  Somalia’s tra-
ditional justice system, the Xeer, is based on clan affiliation.  The use 
of this traditional justice mechanism, in conjunction with other transi-
tional justice means, could be particularly useful in fostering local 
ownership and support for a transitional justice process.173 
Fifth, lustration and compensation are available.  Lustration 
laws provide a mechanism to remove perpetrators of human rights 
violations from positions of authority.174  Programs of reparation and 
 
detained without due process and prisons are overcrowded and beatings and torture 
common.  Id.  The judicial system of Rwanda is severely stretched and does not seem to be 
able to handle the cases brought to it following internationally recognized standards.  Id.  
The cases of Argentina and Germany are also interesting because they highlight the 
difficulties of effective prosecution in the case of strong internal opposition (the military in 
Argentina) or where criminal behavior was widespread and a large part of the population 
played a role in the former abuses (East Germany).  See generally Int’l Ctr. for Transitional 
Justice, Accountability in Argentina:  20 Years Later, Transitional Justice Maintains 
Momentum, (Aug. 2005), available at http://www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-Argentina-
Accountability-Case-2005-English.pdf; JUSTICE IN TRANSITION:  PROSECUTION AND 
AMNESTY IN GERMANY AND SOUTH AFRICA (Gerhard Werle ed., 2006). 
 172. In Uganda, President Museveni reestablished “local council courts” at the village 
level that could also hear land disputes.  See Local Council Courts Act, 2006 (Uganda), 
available at http://www.ulii.org/content/local-council-courts-act-2006.  In Mozambique, 
curandeiros, or traditional healers, played an important role in the reintegration of 
combatants into their villages at the end of a particularly bloody conflict.  SIGNE ARNFRED, 
SEXUALITY & GENDER POLITICS IN MOZAMBIQUE:  RETHINKING GENDER IN AFRICA 234 
(2011). 
 173. See Zuin, supra note 164, at 94–96. 
 174. Lustration mechanisms may include total suspension from an assignment, 
suspension from certain duties, transfers, demotions, early retirement, dismissal, and 
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compensation by the government can help victims cope with material 
losses and can also represent public acknowledgment by a govern-
ment of its (or its predecessor’s) wrongdoing.175 
Sixth, truth and reconciliation commissions are available.  
These are often employed in contexts where the chances of perpetra-
tors being prosecuted, even in the absence of amnesty, are slim.  
TRCs are temporary bodies established at the national level to re-
search and report on past patterns of human rights abuses over a cer-
tain period of time. Typically, TRCs are created in the aftermath of 
prolonged social unrest and conflict, and at a point of political transi-
tion to a democratic government.  Often, TRCs are part of a process 
of national reconciliation and resolution of a civil conflict and are 
generally not a substitute for a judicial process.176  TRCs describe a 
pattern of violations and do not establish individual criminal behav-
ior.177  Past experience shows that the success of a TRC relies heavily 
on the independence, stature, and moral authority of their members.  
For countries with limited resources or for countries that lack a 
strong and independent judiciary, TRCs may provide the best solu-
tion. 
The situation in Somalia is anomalous because it is not struc-
tured as a war between a government and an opposition, as it is often 
 
disqualification from public office.  These can also be added to a conviction of other 
penalties. 
 175. For example, the Government of Sierra Leone provides monthly payments for the 
relatives of those named in the Truth and Reconciliation Commission’s Report.  See Volume 
Two Report, SIERRA LEONE TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION, available at 
http://www.sierra-leone.org/Other-Conflict/TRCVolume2.pdf.  Similarly, Argentina 
provided a lump-sum compensation for the families of the disappeared or killed, or to those 
that were imprisoned for political reasons or forced into exile.  See generally MY NEIGHBOR, 
MY ENEMY:  JUSTICE AND COMMUNITY IN THE AFTERMATH OF MASS ATROCITY (Eric Stover et 
al. eds., 2004).  In addition to monetary compensation, other forms of compensation may 
include medical and educational benefits, waiver of mandatory military service, reinstitution 
in public jobs and housing benefits. 
 176. See generally PRISCILLA B. HAYNER, UNSPEAKABLE TRUTHS:  TRANSITIONAL 
JUSTICE AND THE CHALLENGE OF TRUTH COMMISSIONS (2001). 
 177. TRCs exist for a limited period of time and have specific mandates.  See id.  Their 
structures and procedures differ.  Id.  Their common goal is to produce and disseminate a 
final report, which normally includes conclusions and recommendations.  Id.  Members of 
the TRCs can be well-respected nationals, international experts, or a mix of both.  Id.  Most 
recent commissions have included representatives of local and national human rights NGOs 
and other interests groups.  Id.  One of the main purposes of establishing TRCs is to 
encourage social reconciliation through victims’ healing.  Id. 
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the case in other conflicts.  Somalia is complicated by the fact that 
there are many actors.  In this situation, promoting accountability of 
human rights violations may be a particularly delicate and complex 
endeavor. 
Given these general conditions, in addition to a Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission, there are several mechanisms that could 
be used to account for past human rights abuses.  The experience of 
prior transitional justice processes may serve as a menu of options for 
Somalia and provide useful best practice examples.  The assessment 
of their achievements can assist the SFG in choosing the mechanisms 
that are more suitable for its situation, means, and goals. 
In sum, international law can be a fundamental tool to assist 
in reconstruction efforts, and can specifically be applied in Somalia.  
Indeed, international law can provide and mandate frameworks to 
guide a new government’s actions, can assist in providing actions for 
government, and can also offer examples of best practices.  The final 
step is to ensure that mechanisms exist that allow for international 
law principles to be properly utilized. 
D. Building an International Law Component in Post-Conflict 
Reconstruction 
International law can be immensely useful in post-conflict re-
construction of Somalia, not only because it provides mandatory 
principles, but also because it provides best practices and action 
items for the SFG.  An initial solution to this complex and important 
problem may be simple:  increasing access and exposure to interna-
tional law.  Two mechanisms can be used to ensure that that interna-
tional law is properly utilized:  creating a separate international law 
component in the intervention framework used by the international 
community and securing a sufficient number of international law ad-
visers in all projects. 
The international community’s approach to post-conflict re-
construction in Somalia is principally domestic.  UNSOM’s mandate 
focuses on human rights, the rule of law, and aid coordination.178  A 
separate international law component would ensure that international 
law principles are fully considered and assessed.  The dearth of inter-
national lawyers on staff in international organizations results in lack 
of knowledge of the importance, role, and relevance of international 
 
 178. See supra Section II.A.  
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law; inevitably, it results in its lack of use.  Recruiting international 
lawyers and using existing international law resources would 
strengthen the capacity of international actors and help provide a so-
lution. 
CONCLUSION 
Somalia’s post conflict reconstruction is—to a great extent—
an international legal problem.  However, international law instru-
ments are regrettably absent in the post-conflict reconstruction.  I ar-
gue that this is a mistake, for international law can and does provide 
important tools to guide and assist the reconstruction of Somalia.  
Adopting an international law framework will expedite reconstruc-
tion, ensure stability, and foster involvement by the international 
community.  While this Article focuses on Somalia, its conclusions 
can be adopted in all post-conflict reconstruction situations. 
